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1  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
1.1 Higher education plays a crucial role in UK society. Universities are at 
the forefront of extending research across the sciences and arts. They 
offer life-transforming opportunities for students to engage across the 
wide range of human knowledge and improving life chances for 
individuals. They also benefit their local and the national economy 
through creating jobs, delivering highly-skilled individuals to the 
economy, and developing new products and services.  
 
1.2 International league tables highlight the reputation enjoyed by British 
universities, with six UK universities featuring in a recent ranking of 
the world's top 20 universities.1 However, this position at the top of 
international rankings cannot be taken for granted in the coming years 
as globalisation leads to increased international competition. Higher 
education is also a key contributor to the UK economy and one of the 
country's largest export industries.2
 
 
1.3 In the space of a few short years there has been a major change in the 
way that undergraduate education is organised and delivered in 
England.3 As the result of a number of reforms that followed the 2011 
White Paper 'Students at the Heart of the System',4 student choice 
and competition now play a more significant role in the sector, with a 
greater share of universities' funding coming directly from students 
and freedom for higher education institutions as to the number of 
undergraduate places to offer.5
 
 
1.4 The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) embarked on this Call for Information 
(CfI) in order to gain a better understanding, including by seeking 
views and information from interested parties, of how choice and 
                                      
1 QS World University Rankings 2014. Available at: www.topuniversities.com  
2 UUK (2009), 'The contribution of Universities to the UK economy' (available at: 
www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/highereducation/Documents/2009/EconomicImpact4Full.pdf) estimates that higher 
education contributes some £60 billion per year to the UK economy.  
3 The Call for Information focused on England and did not include Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. Higher 
education policy is a devolved matter, with choice and competition being a more integral part of English higher 
education policies than in other parts of the UK. However, we consider that some of our findings may be of 
interest across the UK, including in relation to the development of future policies 
4 Available at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31384/11-944-higher-
education-students-at-heart-of-system.pdf  
5 The higher education sector in England has recently undergone a series of substantial policy reforms most 
notably through changes to the financing of undergraduate courses (with an increase in the funding resulting from 
student fees and a decrease in direct funding from government), a freeing-up of student control numbers, and the 
introduction of measures aimed at improving access to and quality of information on courses and degrees.  
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competition were working in the higher education sector. The work 
has focused on how analysing whether the benefits from the increased 
role of choice and competition are materialising to the benefit of 
students, and whether any associated risks are being managed 
effectively.6
 
 
1.5 During the course of the CfI we held more than 50 meetings, attended 
sectoral events, and analysed over 80 written submissions. A very 
wide range of issues were raised with us. We believe these can be 
organised according to four broad themes: informed student choice, 
relationships between students and institutions, competition between 
higher education institutions, and the regulatory framework. 
 
1.6 The first theme is the importance of the choices students make in 
relation to which course to study and at which institution. The need to 
persuade students to attend their course to secure funding should 
create powerful incentives for English higher education institutions to 
ensure that their offering addresses student demands. However, this 
will work only if students have access to accurate information on 
available courses when choosing what and where to study. 
 
1.7 There is a good deal of information available to students, but there are 
some significant gaps, including in relation to specific long term 
prospects (such as future income and employment) that result from 
their choice of course and institution. We believe there is scope for a 
better integration of different sources of information; for example, 
given that most students visit the Universities and Colleges 
Admissions Service (UCAS) website, there might be advantages to 
clearer links between the UCAS and Unistats websites. 
 
1.8 The availability of suitable information when choosing a course and 
institution is particularly important because, once a student has 
enrolled on a course, it is often difficult to transfer to a different 
institution (and there are even difficulties in transferring courses within 
a specific institution). 
                                      
6 As in other publicly-funded services, competition and choice can play an important role in helping to deliver high 
quality and consumer-focused services, provided they are implemented in a way which recognises the unique 
features of these markets. For further background on the role of choice and competition in public service delivery 
see OFT1214 'Competition and choice in public services'. Available at: 
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/general/oft1214.pdf  
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1.9 Some of these difficulties arise inevitably because of the problems of 
physically relocating and because of variations in the way in which 
different institutions structure their degrees. But there is some 
evidence that in addition to these barriers, the process for transferring 
is poorly understood by students, and some institutions do not appear 
to have processes in place for assessing whether credits from 
alternative courses are sufficiently equivalent to allow students to 
switch mid-way through a course.  
 
1.10 UCAS plays a central role in the admissions process. There are clear 
potential benefits arising from a centralised system, as evidenced by 
the lower cost and more straightforward system experienced by 
students and higher education providers in the UK as compared with 
other countries such as the United States. UCAS also appears to enjoy 
exceptional levels of user satisfaction from both students and schools. 
However, concerns were raised by a number of stakeholders in relation 
to UCAS' corporate governance and the extent to which all institutions 
have access to its services, the way in which UCAS information is 
integrated with other sources of information available to students, and 
the extent to which applications data is available to others (including 
alternative choice tool providers). 
 
1.11 Regarding the relationship between students and higher education 
institutions, we have identified practices that may mean some 
institutions could be failing to meet their legal obligations under 
consumer protection legislation, which could undermine student 
confidence in the sector. More specifically, some stakeholders raised 
concerns about the accessibility of terms and conditions, the ability of 
students to understand terms, and the extent to which they are fair 
and proportionate. Despite recent improvements to redress processes, 
concerns were also raised about the timeliness and accessibility of the 
processes that deal with student complaints. 
 
1.12 Although the evidence from the CfI does not suggest that the sector is 
characterised by pervasive bad practices, our engagement with 
stakeholders has highlighted that there is significant scope for 
clarifying institutions' responsibilities in relation to students (including 
what students' rights are as a consumer), and for the sector, with the 
help of the relevant government bodies, to ensure their practices are 
fair. In addition, there may be more scope for the sector to more 
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proactively address common complaints, for instance in relation to 
unexpected costs faced by students. 
 
1.13 We consider, therefore, that there would be benefits in the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) initiating a compliance 
review to identify the prevalence of practices that could lead to 
student harm, establish whether they are likely to breach consumer 
protection legislation and/or do not represent best practice and 
consider the most appropriate tools to address concerns. However, it 
should be noted that it is ultimately the responsibility of universities to 
ensure they are compliant with the law and, in order to mitigate risks 
of legal challenge, we strongly encourage higher education institutions 
to use existing consumer law guidance to assess whether their terms, 
conditions, and practices are fair.7
 
 
1.14 In relation to the level and nature of competition between higher 
education institutions, the responses to the CfI do not suggest a 
sector characterised by anti-competitive behaviour. While our analysis 
covered a wide range of potential issues, the most serious and 
prevalent concerns raised by stakeholders related to the extent to 
which fears of breaching competition law might hinder beneficial 
cooperation between institutions, and the nature of the relationship 
between degree-awarding bodies and teaching institutions.  
 
1.15 Despite many generic references by stakeholders to the potential 
(perceived) tensions between collaboration and competition, there 
were no substantive examples that would justify, because of their 
relevance and/or novel nature, the production of specific OFT guidance 
beyond that already available. There is, however, scope for the CMA 
to further highlight that cooperation which delivers countervailing 
consumer benefits may not pose a problem, while ensuring that where 
cooperation between higher education institutions can promote 
efficiency, it is allowed to do so. 
 
1.16 Regarding the relationship between teaching institutions and the 
degree-awarding bodies on which they rely for validation, a number of 
                                      
7 The OFT has published a range of non-sector specific guidance documents, including OFT979 'CPR Basic Guide' 
(available at www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/cpregs/oft979.pdf) OFT1486,'UTCCR checklist' 
(available at www.oft.gov.uk/sitepack/layouts/UTCCR/download-items/OFT1486.pdf ) and OFT311 'Unfair 
contract terms guidance' (available at www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/unfair_contract_terms/oft311.pdf). 
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stakeholders suggested that degree-awarding bodies impose overly 
stringent conditions on teaching institutions which prevent them from 
competing. However, we did not receive substantive evidence that 
would warrant, at this stage, further investigation of these practices, 
especially as there may be legitimate reasons why degree-awarding 
bodies might act in this manner (including safeguarding their 
reputation). 
 
1.17 To date, the OFT has received no complaints or evidence of either 
explicit or tacit collusion between higher education institutions with 
respect to fee setting. The OFT and its successor body - the CMA - 
considers allegations of anti-competitive behaviour that it receives 
carefully, and encourages anyone with specific evidence of this type 
of behaviour taking place to come forward. 
 
1.18 One consistent theme through many of the meetings we held with 
higher education institutions, regulators, student representative bodies 
and other commentators was that the system of regulation that has 
emerged over many decades is complex and increasingly at odds with 
a system based on student choice. We have identified a number of 
challenges to ensuring that the regulatory framework supports student 
choice as a mechanism to drive improvements in higher education. 
More specifically, there are considerable challenges in relation to the 
lack of a level playing field, the role of self-regulation and whether it 
establishes a proper accountability system that reflects the interests of 
the wide range of stakeholders, and the lack of exit regimes for 
situations in which courses close or an institution fails. 
 
1.19 With that in mind, we think that there is scope for the CMA, working 
with and through stakeholders, to inform the design of the regulatory 
regime, providing recommendations as to the principles to abide by 
and how these can best be implemented in an effective and efficient 
manner in order to ensure competition and choice. 
 
1.20 Overall, our analysis of the higher education sector in England 
highlights that it is, in many respects, performing to very high 
standards and enjoys an excellent reputation at the national and 
international level. However, we have identified a number of 
challenges that need to be addressed if the sector is to fulfill its 
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potential to deliver to the benefit of students and the wider society, 
especially in light of the increased role of competition between higher 
education institutions (including internationally) and choice by 
students. In doing so, there is a role for the CMA to play, working 
with and through stakeholders to address these challenges in a timely 
and effective manner. 
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2  INTRODUCTION  
2.1 On 22 October 2013, the OFT launched a CfI on the undergraduate 
higher education sector in England. 
 
2.2 We launched the CfI in order to gain a better understanding of how 
choice and competition were working in the higher education sector. 
In particular, we wanted to explore whether:   
• students are able to make well-informed choices, which would help 
to drive competition 
• students are treated fairly when they get to university 
• there was any evidence of anti-competitive behaviour between 
higher education institutions, and  
• the regulatory environment is designed to protect students and 
facilitate entry, innovation and managed exit by higher education 
institutions.  
 
2.3 The CfI deliberately did not explore policy issues such as access to 
university, whether the cap on fees is set at the appropriate level and 
the mix of subjects being studied by students. We also did not look in 
detail at the effectiveness of the student loan system or the wider 
support prospective students receive (for example, from their schools) 
to make choices.  
 
Background to the CfI 
 
2.4 Recent reforms of the higher education sector in England have aimed 
to drive greater competition between higher education institutions, 
most notably by enabling students to choose between a more diverse 
range of institutions and by rebalancing funding for undergraduate 
education from government to students.8
                                      
8 Reforms include increasing the cap on tuition fees paid by students, the introduction of more information to 
support student choice, an ambition to remove regulatory barriers imposed on alternative providers (APs) and 
further education colleges (FECs) and most recently lifting the Student Number Controls so higher education 
providers can now recruit an unlimited number of students. 
 Subsequently, higher 
education institutions depend more than ever on revenue from tuition 
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fees, and hence on their ability to attract students. 
 
2.5 The increasing role of student choice and competition could act as a 
powerful incentive in the higher education sector. This may lead to 
higher education institutions more closely tailoring their offer according 
to the demands of students and future employers; enhancing 
innovation and raising standards. 
 
2.6 However, the introduction of choice and competition in public markets 
(such as higher education) is not exempt from risks, and the 
introduction of such 'market-based' incentives should be done in a 
way which carefully considers the characteristics of the sector.9
2.7 In the case of the higher education sector, the OFT was particularly 
keen to gain a better understanding of the extent to which, following 
the reforms, the potential benefits of choice and competition are 
materialising (and if not, what are the obstacles), and whether any 
risks are effectively managed.  
 For 
instance, the embedding of choice and competition needs to take into 
account the possibility of a 'race towards the bottom' in standards 
(and if there is a risk, how it is managed), and the impact that the 
regulatory framework has on competition.  
 
 
The OFT's mission and powers 
 
2.8 The OFT's mission is to make markets work well for consumers. 
Markets work well when businesses are in open, fair and vigorous 
competition with each other to attract consumers.  
 
2.9 In undertaking this CfI we used the powers afforded to us under 
Section 5 of the Enterprise Act 2002, which sets out the OFT's 
general function of obtaining, compiling, and keeping under review 
information about matters relating to the carrying out of its functions. 
This report sets out a summary of the evidence we received from 
respondents and the analysis that we conducted. For reasons of 
commercial confidentiality, material may appear in an anonymous, 
aggregated, or otherwise redacted form.  
                                      
9 See OFT1214, 'Choice and Competition in Public Services'. Available at: 
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/general/oft1214.pdf   
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The Competition and Markets Authority 
 
2.10 Both the OFT and the Competition Commission (CC) will cease to exist 
on the 31 March 2014. The CMA was legally established on 1 
October 2013 and will become fully operational on 1 April 2014. The 
new unified Authority will bring together the CC with the competition 
and certain consumer functions of the OFT and will be responsible for 
promoting competition for the benefit of consumers. 
 
2.11 Any proposed further action following the findings of this CfI will be 
confirmed by representatives of the CMA in due course. 
 
Activities and data sources 
 
2.12 We have collected and reviewed information from a variety of sources 
during the CfI. In particular, we have: 
• received some 80 formal written submissions from government and 
sector bodies (6), higher education institutions (20), trade bodies 
and associations (8), consumer and interest groups (10), and 
individuals/students (35) carried out over 50 bilateral meetings with 
sector participants in order to gain further information on the way 
the sector operates 
• co-hosted three roundtables, two with University administrators and 
vice-chancellors, and one with Further Education colleges, and 
• reviewed relevant publicly available data including government 
reports, and academic literature. 
 
Structure of the report 
 
2.13 This report consists of six chapters and three annexes. The main body 
of the report is organised as follows: 
• Chapter 3 provides an overview of the higher education sector, 
including recent policy developments 
• Chapter 4 sets out our analysis of whether students are making 
informed choices 
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• Chapter 5 sets out our analysis of the student experience at 
university 
• Chapter 6 sets out our analysis of the ways in which higher 
education institutions compete with one another 
• Chapter 7 sets out our analysis of the regulatory environment, and 
• Chapter 8 sets out the issues that we believe warrant further 
consideration. 
 
2.14 The three annexes provide further information that supports the 
analysis contained in the chapters above, as follows: 
• Annexe A contains a summary of the types of indicators featured 
on various choice tool websites 
• Annexe B provides a brief explanation of the relevant legal 
framework to assess university practices, and 
• Annexe C provides a brief explanation of the relevant legal 
framework to assess anti-competitive practices. 
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3  BACKGROUND  
Introduction 
 
3.1 The higher education sector involves many different types of 
institution, course and student. It is subject to a complex regulatory 
regime, with different bodies influencing or taking responsibility for 
funding, quality assurance and applications, amongst other things. 
 
3.2 As a result of major policy reform, there have been a number of 
significant developments in the sector over recent years. Amidst other 
policy objectives, these reforms have aimed to give students more 
choice and drive greater competition between providers. 
 
3.3 The CfI focuses specifically on the undergraduate higher education 
sector in England. Undergraduate education is defined as the process 
of gaining one's first tertiary degree, and typically occurs post-
secondary education up to the level of a bachelor's degree. 
 
3.4 The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the key elements of the 
higher education sector and to highlight the changes that have made 
the sector more 'market based' including:  
• the diverse range of higher education institutions 
• an increasing focus on student choice 
• how higher education institutions are regulated, and 
• who attends university (and how they apply). 
 
The diverse range of higher education institutions 
 
3.5 The undergraduate higher education sector is characterised by a 
diverse range of higher education institutions, which vary in terms of 
whether they can directly award degrees and whether they can access 
student loan support and government funding. Higher education 
institutions can be broadly categorised as: 
• publicly funded universities and higher education colleges, 
sometimes referred to as 'traditional providers' (TPs) 
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• further education colleges (FECs) that offer higher education 
courses or 
• privately funded universities and colleges, sometimes referred to as 
'alternative providers' (APs).10
3.6 Institutions can be 'designated providers' of higher education, that is, 
they are eligible for public funding and/or student support. Publicly 
funded higher education institutions are designated at institution-level 
which means the whole institution will be eligible for public funding 
and/or student support. APs must apply for course-level designation, 
meaning some courses could be eligible for student support whereas 
other courses within the same institution could not be.
 
 
11
3.7 Only a legally approved degree-awarding body with ultimate 
responsibility for quality and academic standards can award degrees in 
the UK.
 The 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) is responsible for 
awarding designation to higher education institutions. 
 
12
3.8 Most publicly funded higher education institutions have DAPs, 
whereas only some FECs and APs do. FECs and APs without their own 
DAPs can partner with degree-awarding higher education institutions 
to validate individual courses, or can enter into a franchise agreement 
directly or indirectly with the degree-awarding higher education 
provider.
 An institution can be granted degree-awarding powers 
(DAPs) by a Royal Charter, an Act of Parliament or by the Privy 
Council (a formal body of advisers to the Queen). 
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3.9 Given the diverse nature of the higher education sector it is important 
that the regulatory environment supports a full range of institutions to 
                                      
10 In referring to APs the OFT is using BIS' definition, available at: 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/205355/bis-13-903-alternative-providers-
specific-course-designation-guidance-for-applicants-criteria-and-conditions.pdf  
11 HEFCE (2013) 'Operating Framework for Higher Education' available at: 
www.hefce.ac.uk/media/hefce/content/about/introduction/workinginpartnership/rpg/operatingframework/operating
_framework_for_HE_11072013_2.pdf  
12 www.qaa.ac.uk/aboutus/dap/Pages/default.aspx  
13 HEFCE defines a franchise as 'the agreement by one institution (usually an higher education institution) that 
another institution may deliver all or part of a programme approved and owned by the first institution. The 
franchising institution normally retains overall control of the programme's content, delivery, assessment and 
quality assurance arrangements'. Validation is defined as 'the process by which a course is judged to have met 
the requirements for an award by the relevant degree-awarding body, or the relevant examining body, or by an 
accredited institution on behalf of that degree-awarding body'. Available at: www.hefce.ac.uk/glossary  
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compete for students and does not impose any unjustifiable costs and 
restrictions on particular institutions. We explore the role of the 
regulatory environment in supporting choice and competition in 
Chapter 7.  
 
3.10 Higher education institutions are becoming increasingly free to 
compete for students. It was announced in the 2013 Autumn 
Statement that Student Number Controls would be abolished for 
Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) funded 
providers with effect from 2015-16.14
 
 This completed a process of 
relaxing the limits on student recruitment that began in 2012. In 
effect, institutions will be free to recruit, or not to recruit, as many 
students as they want, further increasing the competitive incentives in 
the sector.  
An increased focus on student choice  
 
3.11 In addition to an increasingly diverse 'supply side', reforms to the 
'demand side' of the sector should also mean institutions are 
increasingly incentivised to compete for students. The most significant 
recent changes to the demand side of the market are moves to enable 
students to make more informed choices that they, in principle, should 
carefully consider given that they are also increasingly contributing to 
the cost of their undergraduate education.  
 
3.12 In order to help students make an informed decision about which 
courses and institutions to choose (which is arguably becoming 
increasingly important given the additional financial costs), there has 
been a government-backed drive to reform information provision to 
prospective students. This resulted in the launch of the 'Key 
Information Sets' (KIS) and the Unistats website.15
                                      
14 Student Number Controls currently impose a limit on the number of students that each university can recruit, 
with certain exemptions for high-achieving students. Autumn Statement 2013 available at: 
 Some of the data 
that features on the Unistats website is managed by the Higher 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263942/35062_Autumn_Statement_201
3.pdf 
15 The 'Key Information Set' (KIS) displays the National Student Survey results, the proportion of time spent in 
various learning and teaching activities, the proportion of summative assessment by method, professional, 
statutory and regulatory bodies that recognise the course, average annual costs for institution owned and 
privately rented accommodation, financial support available from the institution, average fees, the destination of 
leavers six months after completing a course (and of those in employment the proportion in 
managerial/professional jobs) and the salary data for those in full time employment four months after completing 
the course. 
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Education Statistics Agency (HESA). Chapter 4 discusses the use of 
these tools in more detail. 
 
3.13 The Government withdrew a significant portion of direct funding for 
teaching new undergraduate students from 2012-13 onwards. This 
grant is administered by HEFCE, a non-departmental public body 
responsible for distributing funding for higher education to universities 
and colleges in England.16
3.14 The withdrawal of the HEFCE teaching grant occurred simultaneously 
with an increase in the tuition fee cap for undergraduate students.
 
 
17 
Figure 3.1 below shows how direct fees from students have recently 
become - and will remain - the most significant source of funding.18 
The average headline tuition fee for 2014-15 will be £8,647 (falling to 
£8,006 taking into account all financial support from institutions).19
 
 
3.15 The vast majority of undergraduate students domiciled in England 
receive funding support through the Student Loans Company (SLC), 
both in the form of tuition fee loans and maintenance loans/grants. 
Graduates repay debt on an income-contingent basis, making 
payments once their earnings pass beyond a certain earnings 
threshold. 
 
  
                                      
16 www.hefce.ac.uk/about  
17 Tuition fees were first introduced in the UK higher education sector in 1998-99, at which time Government 
imposed a cap of £1,000 pa (increasing in line with inflation). This was increased to £3,000 pa in 2005-06, and 
most recently increased to £9,000 pa in 2012-13 following recommendations in the 2011 White Paper. 
18 Figure 3.1 shows a gradual rather than steep decline in HEFCE funding because the Government withdrew 
funding for new undergraduate students only. Students already in higher education did not face higher tuition 
fees, and the HEFCE teaching grant remained in place for these students. The portion attributable to each source 
of funding will become stable from 2015-16. 
19 OFFA (2013) '2014-15 access agreements: institutional expenditure and fee levels'. Available at: 
www.offa.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2013-04-Access-agreements-2014-15.pdf  
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Figure 3.1: Balance between HEFCE teaching grant and tuition fee outlay to 
2014-15 
 
 
 
Source: Universities UK20
 
 
Regulation of higher education institutions 
 
3.16 BIS has ultimate responsibility and accountability for higher education 
policy in England. Individual responsibilities are delegated to bodies 
such as HEFCE and the Office for Fair Access (OFFA), which are 
overseen by BIS.  
 
3.17 Designated higher education institutions are subject to the regulations 
described in HEFCE's Operating Framework (the 'Operating 
Framework'). The Operating Framework is designed to protect student 
interests, institutional autonomy and academic freedom, as well as 
ensuring accountability for public funding.21
 
 
                                      
20 Universities UK (2013) 'Where Student Fees Go'. Available at: 
www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/highereducation/Documents/2013/WhereStudentFeesGo.pdf  
21 HEFCE (2013) 'Operating Framework for Higher Education'. Available at: 
www.hefce.ac.uk/media/hefce/content/about/introduction/workinginpartnership/rpg/operatingframework/operating
_framework_for_HE_11072013_2.pdf 
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3.18 The Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) forms part of the Operating 
Framework and is contracted by HEFCE (who has a statutory duty to 
make provision for the assessment of the quality of provision it funds) 
to conduct qualitative assurance reviews. Approximately every six 
years the QAA review team assesses how an institution sets and 
maintains academic standards, manages the quality of students' 
learning opportunities, enhances its educational provision and manages 
the quality of its public information.22
 
 After an institutional review, the 
QAA will publish an Institutional Audit Report outlining elements of 
good practice and recommendations for action.  
3.19 In the 2011 White Paper 'Students at the Heart of the System', it was 
proposed that a more 'level-playing field' between different types of 
higher education institutions should be created by removing unjustified 
regulatory barriers imposed on APs and FECs. This was intended to 
enhance competition and diversity in the sector. Chapter 7 explores 
some of the outstanding barriers to a level playing field between 
different types of institutions. 
 
3.20 The Office of the Independent Adjudicator (OIA) serves as an 
independent ombudsman of last resort for students who have 
exhausted the internal complaints or appeals processes at the 
institution. The OIA will not rule on matters of academic judgment or 
admissions but can look at, for example, a service provided by the 
universities, teaching and facilities. Students must escalate their 
complaint to the OIA within three months of receiving their 
Competition of Procedures Letter from their university (which students 
receive once they have completed the university's procedures). Each 
university has its own arrangements for handling complaints.  
 
Who attends university and how they apply  
 
3.21 There were 1.8 million undergraduate students enrolled at 161 UK 
higher education institutions in the 2012-13 academic year.23,24
                                      
22 More information about the review process is available at: 
 Figure 
3.2 highlights the composition of the undergraduate student body at 
www.qaa.ac.uk/institutionreports/types-of-
review/ireni/pages/default.aspx 
23 Institutions reporting to HESA. 
24 HESA (2014) '2012-13 students by institution'. Available at: www.hesa.ac.uk/content/view/1897/239  
20  OFT1529 
this time,25
 
 of which UK-domiciled full time students of socio-
economic classes 1-3 formed the majority. 
Figure 3.2: The undergraduate student body at UK higher education 
institutions, 2012-13 
 
 
Source: OFT26
 
 
3.22 Participation in higher education, as measured by the Higher Education 
Initial Participation Rate (HEIPR), has grown from 39 per cent to 49 
per cent between 1999-00 and 2011-12.27,28 The participation rate in 
the UK has been close to the OECD average in recent years.29
 
 
3.23 UCAS is the centralised provider of admissions services, linking 
applicants to institutions. The significant majority of full time 
undergraduate student applications are managed through UCAS,30
                                      
25 Mode of study and domicile based on the population of student enrolments 2012-13. Gender/subject type 
based on qualifications obtained 2012-13. Age at entry based on incoming first year students 2012-13. NS-SEC 
measures the Socio-Economic Class of first year students in 2011-12. 
 
26 HESA (2014) 'Overview of student data'. Available at: www.hesa.ac.uk/content/view/1897/239  
27 Parliamentary Briefing Paper SN02630 (2013). Available at: www.parliament.uk/briefing-
papers/SN02630/participation-in-higher-education-social-indicators-page.pdf  
28 The HEIPR replaced the Age Participation Index, which measured the proportion of under-21s entering higher 
education. This increased from 12 per cent in 1979 to 32 per cent in the late 1990s. 
29 Available at: www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/tertiary-education-entry-rates_20755120-table2 
30 A number of courses outside the HEFCE framework are not listed on UCAS. In addition, a small minority of full 
time students apply directly to institutions, rather than having their application administered through UCAS. Part 
time students apply directly to the institution. 
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which allows students to submit a maximum of five choices of course 
in any applications cycle. Students' application forms are processed in 
a single common format to streamline the process. 
 
3.24 Figure 3.3 highlights the number of applications to UK higher 
education institutions in recent years. The graph shows a consistent 
upward trend between 2007-08 and 2010-11, but was affected 
beyond this point by the changes to the fee regime. An upwards trend 
has been resumed in 2013-14, however at a lower rate than previous 
years. 
 
Figure 3.3: Number of applications to UK higher education institutions, 
2007-08 to 2013-14 
 
 
Source: OFT31
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
31 UCAS (2013) 'Application Cycle: End of Cycle Report'. Available at: www.ucas.com/sites/default/files/ucas-
2013-end-of-cycle-re port.pdf  
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4  ENABLING STUDENTS TO MAKE INFORMED CHOICES  
 
4.1 Making the right choice about where and what to study is essential 
both from the student's individual perspective and also to ensure that 
the higher education sector delivers the highly qualified workforce 
needed to compete in an increasingly globalised economy.  
 
4.2 Choosing what to study at undergraduate level is, for most students, a 
'one off' decision given the high economic and social costs of 
switching between universities.32
 
 The student's choice will have an 
effect on their knowledge, skills, future careers and earnings as well 
as less tangible, yet crucial, factors such as social development. 
4.3 Student choices of where and what to study are influenced by a 
number of 'tangible' and less tangible factors. Students appear to take 
into account aspects of the learning experience and likely longer-term 
career prospects, such as course content, academic reputation, league 
table rankings and employment prospects.33 Student choices are also 
likely to be influenced by other factors related to class (connected to 
confidence, awareness and expectation), tradition, culture and 
ethnicity.34 The advice and information students receive also 
influences their choices. Advice and information can come from a 
range of sources including students' parents, teachers, and 
institutional open days, institutions' websites and via third parties.35
 
  
4.4 The CfI has focused on whether the information available on 
institutions' and third party 'choice tool' websites allows students to 
make informed choices. We have focused on information for two key 
reasons. First, if students can access information which allows them 
to understand clearly what institutions offer, and the differences 
between these offers, they may make more informed choices. This in 
                                      
32 We discuss barriers to switching in more detail in paragraphs 4.44-4.50.  
33 See for example, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the Sutton Trust (2012) 
'Tracking the decision making of high achieving higher education applicants'. Available at: 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/82789/12-1240-tracking-decision-making-
of-high-achieving-higher-education-applicants.pdf. 
34 Stephen Ball, Jackie Davies, Miriam David, Diane Reay (2010) 'Classification of judgment: social class and the 
'cognitive structures' of choice in higher education'. British Journal of Sociology of Education, Vol. 23, issue 1, 
pp.51-72. 
35 HEFCE has explored the importance of information, and different types of information, in informing student 
choice. See HEFCE (2010) 'Understanding the information needs of users of public information about higher 
education.' Available at: www.hefce.ac.uk/media/hefce/content/pubs/2010/rd1210/rd12_10b.pdf  
23  OFT1529 
turn may improve student engagement, satisfaction, retention and 
success whilst at university and employability after university.  
 
4.5 Second, access to clear information which informs student choice can 
also help to drive effective competition between higher education 
institutions. If students are better able to choose institutions that meet 
their preferences on the basis of actual information, as opposed to 
reliance on received wisdom or other factors, it may create an 
incentive for institutions to be responsive to student preferences.  
 
4.6 Through the CfI the OFT sought to find out whether students can 
access, assess and act on comparable information to enable them to 
make informed choices about institutions and courses. We were 
particularly keen to identify any issues or practices which meant that 
students were not getting useful, valid and reliable information. We 
also wanted to understand how the application process supports 
students in acting on their choices and whether the switching process 
between courses and institutions might allow students to mitigate a 
poor initial choice. 
 
4.7 However, given that in some respects education may be characterised 
as a 'post-experience good' (meaning that quality is not known before 
the student has been through university) ,36
 
 and that quality can be 
interpreted differently by different students, there are limits to what 
information provision can achieve. Therefore, we also considered the 
extent to which choice could be relied upon to drive improvements in 
quality in our analysis. 
Information sources available to prospective students  
 
4.8 Through the CfI the OFT set out to gather views from a range of 
stakeholders about the extent to which existing information is useful 
and easily accessible to prospective students. We also wanted to 
know whether there are any 'information gaps which, if addressed, 
would allow students to make better informed choices.  
                                      
36 Weimer and Vining (1992) categorised higher education as a 'post-experience' good, the quality of which can 
only be established well after it has been 'consumed', and perhaps not even then - see Weimer, D. L and Vining, 
A R. (1992) 'Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice.' Also see Roger Brown (2012) 'Competition and Choice in 
Higher Education'. Available at: http://cdbu.org.uk/competition-and-choice-in-undergraduate-education 
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4.9 Many respondents emphasised that the undergraduate sector is served 
by many (third-party) choice-tools, including websites and publications 
which help students make choices.37 These range from league tables 
which rank institutions according to certain criteria, more interactive 
websites such as the government-hosted Unistats website, which 
displays the KIS (a set of information about student satisfaction, 
teaching methods and employment outcomes), through to websites 
such as The Student Rooms which are run by students.38
 
 As illustrated 
in Annexe A, the information available on choice tool websites is 
increasingly focused on the university experience (including the 
teaching and learning aspects of higher education) as opposed to the 
institutions' research outputs, which has traditionally been the focus 
of league tables.  
4.10 From our review of third party choice tools, it appears that information 
provision is becoming increasingly user friendly.39 For instance, it is 
now possible for students to input their preferences (in terms of 
location and courses) and compare information about options that 
match their preferences. Unistats 'widgets'40
 
 also appear on higher 
education institutions' websites, giving students an easily digestible 
summary of KIS data.  
4.11 In addition, more detailed information is usually accessible on higher 
education institution websites. Websites usually contain information 
on course content, university rules and regulations, and facilities 
available to students.  
 
4.12 However, and despite recent improvements in information provision, 
respondents highlighted some information gaps and ways in which the 
information that is presented could be improved. The concerns 
centered on:  
                                      
37 The OFT defines choice tools as structured sources of information, discussion and comparison that help 
consumers compare and choose between alternative service and product offerings. See OFT1321 'Empowering 
consumers of public services through choice-tools'. Available at: 
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/consumer_protection/oft1321.pdf  
38 Students can set up their own discussion forums on the The Student Rooms to discuss any aspect of the 
university experience. Students can also access official university profiles on The Student Rooms website. 
Available at: www.thestudentroom.co.uk  
39 For a full list of the websites we reviewed see Annexe A. We focused our assessment on a sample of more 
'interactive' websites where students can input their preferences and receive suggestions about suitable courses 
and institutions. It should be noted however, that there are also numerous league tables that students can (and 
do) use to inform their choices.  
40 A Unistats widget runs on the higher education institution website and displays a summary of the information 
contained on the Unistats website. 
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• information gaps about the learning experience 
• information gaps about the course outcomes 
• information gaps about the offer beyond the learning experience 
• the ways in which existing information is displayed, and 
• factors to consider when re-designing the system of information 
provision. 
 
Information gaps about the learning experience and educational gains 
 
4.13 There appears to be a degree of consensus across the sector that 
students should be able to access information about the learning 
experience offered by different higher education institutions. However, 
what these indicators should be is more contested, as exemplified by 
the different views on the extent to which contact hours should be 
considered a key variable to include in the information provided to 
students.41
 
  
4.14 Notwithstanding that the inclusion of certain variables might prove 
controversial, there are a number of indicators that, if available, are 
likely to give students an insight into the quality of the course. For 
example, Professor Graham Gibbs has looked at the factors, 
summarised in Figure 4.1, that predict the quality of the undergraduate 
experience which he defines as the 'educational gains' students are 
likely to achieve at university.42
                                      
41 A recent Which?/HEPI student experience survey (Which?/HEPI (2013) 'The student academic experience 
survey'. Available at: 
 Gibbs finds that certain indicators are 
better predictors of educational gains than others, pointing to process 
variables which encourage student engagement such as class size, 
www.staticwhich.co.uk/documents/pdf/the-student-academic-experience-survey-
319689.pdf) found that significant differences, unacknowledged in the information available to prospective 
students, between the contact hours available to students studying the same course at different institutions. For 
instance, the survey found students studying physical sciences can receive anywhere between 11 and 25 hours 
per week and social studies students anywhere between nine and 16 hours. However, a number of respondents 
to our CfI questioned whether students should be able to access comparable information about contact hours 
without being able to access other indicators which reflect quality. Their concerns were that students might 
interpret contact hours and reflecting quality (when a range of factors reflect quality) and an undue focus on 
contact hours could lead to unintended consequences such as class sizes increasing.  
42 Gibbs argues that as educational performance is predicted by the entry standards of students, to compare 
institutional performance in a valid way it is necessary to measure 'educational gain', that is, the difference on a 
particular measure before and after the student's experience of university. See Gibbs (2010) 'Dimensions of 
Quality'. Available at: 
www.celt.mmu.ac.uk/policy/ltmmu/docs/Dimensions_of_Quality%20%20Graham%20Gibbs.pdf 
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who undertakes the teaching and the quality and quality of feedback 
as being the most valid indicators. 
 
Figure 4.1: Dimensions of Quality according to Gibbs43
 
 
Source: Gibbs44
 
 
4.15 Using this framework to assess the main choice tools reveals a 
number of information gaps around the indicators most likely to predict 
educational gains.45 As outlined in Annexe A, the main information 
gaps appear to be the staff to student ratio, funding per pupil, who the 
students will be taught by, a direct proxy for the quality of their 
teaching, class sizes and contact hours.46
 
 
4.16 A number of respondents highlighted that it is difficult for prospective 
students to identify differences between institutions on these 
dimensions, as differences can be significant. The implication is that 
institutions may not, through the mechanism of student choice, be 
incentivised to focus on the factors that would improve educational 
gains and ultimately students' learning experience.  
                                      
43 Presage variables define the context before students start learning, process variables describe what goes on as 
students learn, and product variables relate to the outcomes of that learning. 
44 Gibbs (2010) 'Dimensions of Quality.' Available at: 
www.celt.mmu.ac.uk/policy/ltmmu/docs/Dimensions_of_Quality%20%20Graham%20Gibbs.pdf 
45 As illustrated in Annexe A, we analysed six 'choice tool' websites to determine whether they display 
information about the 12 elements of quality according to Gibbs. For 'Research Environment' we looked for any 
information on the Research Assessment Exercise and for 'Level of Intellectual Challenge' we looked for NSS 
results stating whether the 'course is intellectually stimulating'. 
46 The National Student Survey scores, which are displayed on a number of third party websites, only indirectly 
measure the quality of teaching at an institution. 
•Funding 
•Student/ Staff Ratios 
•Quality of Staff 
•Quality of Students 
Prestige variables 
(least predictive)  
•Class size 
•Contact Hours 
•Assessment and Feedback 
•Research Environment 
•Level of Intellectual Challenge 
Process Variables 
(most predictive) •Student Performance and 
Degree Classification 
•Student Retention 
•Employability 
Product Variables 
(difficult to 
compare) 
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Information gaps about course outcomes 
 
4.17 Employment prospects are a key outcome of the undergraduate 
experience that students appear to want to know about when 
applying.47
 
 However, a number of respondents highlighted that the 
employment and salary data currently available does not necessarily 
help inform student choice.  
4.18 For example, the Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education 
(DLHE) survey (which is used by a number of third party websites, 
including Unistats) records the type of employment and salary of 
graduates six months after completing the course.48
 
 The Longitudinal 
DLHE also records the salaries of graduates in full-time employment 40 
months after graduation. However, because the long-term data is 
collected from a stratified sample of students who responded to the 
six-month survey, there is usually insufficient data to calculate robust 
institution or course level statistics. It is therefore difficult for 
prospective students to compare the likely longer term employment 
and earning prospects of attending different courses and institutions. 
4.19 Respondents also highlighted that, at the moment, the employment 
data that is used by choice tool websites does not take into account 
the fact that some institutions take on students with different 
backgrounds and abilities.49
 
 This means that institutions which take on 
more privileged and/or capable students (who have better employment 
prospects) are looked on more advantageously in the rankings. More 
generally, it is also difficult for prospective students to know what 
employers think about different courses. 
4.20 Notwithstanding the challenges in collecting and publishing longer-
term employment data (not least how to take into account the value 
added by universities), the sector in general, and HEFCE in particular, 
                                      
47 HEFCE have also found that students value information about employability (see HEFCE (2010) 'Understanding 
the information needs of users of public information about higher education'. Available at: 
www.hefce.ac.uk/media/hefce/content/pubs/2010/rd1210/rd12_10b.pdf). Information gaps should be seen as 
distinct from information that is not easy to assess, covered in the section below.  
48 Whilst the actual salary data is collected, Unistats displays the average salary of graduates six months after 
graduation. The type of employment consists of 'working, studying, working and studying, unemployed and not 
available for work'. Of those in employment the proportion of managerial/professional jobs six months after 
graduation is also displayed.  
49 This means that from current employment data it is difficult to disentangle the raft of variables that would 
explain why students' career progression differs. 
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might perhaps focus their ongoing efforts on improving the quality and 
comparability of information on long term employment and salary 
prospects.  
 
Information about the 'offer' beyond the learning experience 
 
4.21 When choosing between institutions and courses, students are 
interested in a broader range of factors than those related to the 
quality of the teaching and the likely learning outcomes.50
 
 In this 
respect, respondents highlighted a number of information gaps which 
they felt were undermining the extent to which students understood 
the broader offer made by institutions. The main information gaps 
were in relation to additional charges, the 'regulatory status' of the 
university, and financial support.  
Additional charges  
 
4.22 Additional charges can be defined as charges, on top of the tuition 
fee, that students have to (or are strongly encouraged to) incur in 
order to complete their course or degree.51
 
 'Hidden' additional charges, 
which students do not know about when choosing where to apply, are 
a particular concern because the student may not be able to afford the 
charge, may not be able to make an informed decision about where to 
apply, and is not in a good position to put pressure on the institution 
to keep charges low once they are at university.  
4.23 In recent years there has been increased focus on making additional 
charges clear to students before they get to university, including a 
2012 National Union of Students (NUS) campaign.52
                                      
50 Although the OFT has not done a comprehensive analysis of what students say they want to know about when 
choosing between higher education institutions, this has been a recurrent message from our engagement with 
stakeholders. 
 As a result, there 
51 The Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998 and Higher Education Act 2004 (HEA04) set the rules about 
what has to be included in a student's tuition fee. The HEA04 defines tuition fees as 'fees in respect of, or 
otherwise in connection with, undertaking the course, including admission, registration, tuition and graduation 
fees'. However, there are various exceptions including fees payable for board and lodging, fees for field trips, fees 
related to goods that become the property of the student and fees payable for attending any graduation or other 
ceremony. 
52 In 2012 the NUS ran a 'hidden costs' campaign for universities to get rid of additional charges, secure financial 
support to help cover additional costs or ensure such costs are upfront and transparent before students apply. 
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are examples of good practice in terms of disclosure of additional 
charges to prospective students.53
4.24 However, students still appear to be incurring additional charges when 
at university or college which they did not know about when applying. 
A 2012 NUS student survey found that 69 per cent of 8,871 
undergraduate students surveyed stated they incurred additional 
charges.
 
54
 
 Some of these charges students knew about in advance of 
applying, but there are some types of charges, mainly related to 
course specific costs (such as equipment/studio hire and bench fees), 
that some students appear not to know about in advance. The 
existence of hidden charges was corroborated by the CfI responses. 
For instance, one respondent that worked with media and drama 
students was particularly concerned about the high cost of equipment 
and studio hire which he thought students did not know about in 
advance.  
4.25 With budgets in the sector remaining tight, there is a risk that the cap 
on fees may result in institutions increasing additional charges. To try 
to place some competitive pressure on additional charges, we 
recommend universities follow best practice and provide students with 
a course-specific summary of the additional charges they are likely to 
incur, ideally both alongside course information when students are 
considering where to apply and when they are sent an offer. The 
prevalence, significance and fairness of hidden charges is an issue that 
the CMA could explore in further detail as part of its compliance 
review. 
 
The 'regulatory status' of the provider 
 
4.26 In public service sectors where the quality of services is difficult to 
assess ex-ante, regulators and government bodies often have a role to 
play in assessing quality and the risks facing providers. The 'regulatory 
status'; both in terms of which regulatory institutions oversee the 
provider and what the regulators think of the provider's performance, 
is usually communicated to prospective service users either directly or 
through third party websites.55
                                      
53 For example, the University of Wolverhampton publishes an 'all inclusive fee' detailing what is, and is not, 
included in the tuition fee. Available at: 
  
www.wlv.ac.uk/PDF/transparent-fee.pdf 
54 NUS (2012), 'Pound in Your Pocket' survey. Available at: 
www.poundinyourpocket.org.uk/downloads/PIYP_Summary_Report.pdf  
55 For example, parents can look at Ofsted ratings when choosing schools for their children. 
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4.27 From the summer of 2014, HEFCE will publish and maintain a register 
of all higher education institutions that are subject to the higher 
education assurance framework.56 Whilst the details are still being 
finalised, HEFCE has stated that the register will set out the 
accountability responsibilities of each organisation and the latest 
publicly available information (such as the latest QAA Institutional 
Review) about each university and college, including critical risk 
factors (such as imminent corporate failure).57
 
 The aspiration is that 
the register will explain what assurances can be given about a higher 
education institution, and which aspects of the institution's 
performance the student should seek further information about.  
4.28 The development of the register is welcomed, as it will provide a 
single portal through which students will be able to access and assess 
performance risks faced by institutions which HEFCE considers should 
be in the public domain. We encourage HEFCE to consider how the 
information and risks identified in the register can best feed into choice 
tools and student decision making, such as linking the register with 
the UCAS portal.58
 
  
Financial support  
 
4.29 There is some evidence to suggest that students do not know about 
the financial support that will be available to them from their higher 
education institution. For instance, a 2013 NUS survey found that 29 
per cent of the 754 respondents reported that the financial support 
available (for example, bursaries and scholarships) was a little or a lot 
worse than they had expected when they applied59
                                      
56 This will include all English institutions with UK degree awarding powers, those which are grant funded by 
HEFCE and/or those which have been designated so that students on a course they teach may apply for student 
support.  
. This could indicate 
that students are not sufficiently informed about (or the information 
available leads them to overestimate) the financial support available to 
57 Regulatory Partnership Group (2013), 'Operating framework for higher education in England' (available at: 
www.hefce.ac.uk/media/hefce/content/about/introduction/workinginpartnership/rpg/operatingframework/operating
_framework_for_HE_11072013_2.pdf). It should be noted, however, each higher education institution in England 
will take part in an Institutional Review approximately every six years so the information available may be quite 
old.  
58 Currently, prospective students can access Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) assessments via Unistats, but 
there is no flag or indicator to highlight when an institution is not directly overseen by the QAA and whether or 
not the institution is part of the Office of the Independent Adjudicator (OIA).  
59 Information submitted to the OFT. 
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them at university, something corroborated by a number of 
respondents to our CfI. As we outline below, there appears therefore 
to be scope for institutions to make it clearer when students apply and 
when they receive an offer what financial support will be available.  
 
The way in which information is displayed 
 
4.30 Respondents to our CfI also raised some concerns about how the 
information currently available to students through third-party and/or 
provider websites was displayed. The main concerns related to 
information displayed in percentages, description of accreditation, and 
institutions' terms and conditions. 
 
Information displayed in percentages  
  
4.31 A number of third party websites display information about academic 
experience (in particular, what activities the student will undertake and 
what type of assessment they will have to do) as percentages rather 
than in absolute terms. For example, Unistats (using KIS data) displays 
the proportion of time the student will spend in various learning and 
teaching activities. As a result, and as highlighted above, significant 
differences in the actual amount of time spent in these activities 
across different institutions cannot be assessed by prospective 
students.  
 
Descriptions of accreditation  
 
4.32 Following concerns raised by one respondent that descriptions of 
accredited courses on institutional and third party websites did not 
make it clear to prospective students that they had to do further study 
to qualify as a professional,60
                                      
60 For example, the educational base to be a Chartered Engineer is a four-year accredited Master of Engineering 
(MEng) degree, or a three- year Bachelor of Engineering (BEng) degree plus a one-year masters degree. One 
respondent raised concern that it was not clear to students whether or not the BEng undergraduate degree is 
accredited by a professional body and that further study is required to become a Chartered Engineer. 
 the OFT conducted a small analysis of 
how engineering degrees on institutional and third party websites are 
described. From this (limited) sample, it seems the wording on some 
websites is quite vague and there may be scope for universities and 
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third parties to emulate 'best practice' descriptions that we found on 
other websites.61
 
  
4.33 It should be noted, however, that so far we have found no strong 
evidence that institutions are making misleading claims. Accreditation 
bodies have a strong reputational incentive to ensure that higher 
education institutions do not make misleading claims about 
accreditation and may be advised to check how universities are 
marketing their accreditations to students. Nevertheless, the scope for 
misleading information about accreditation (and about courses more 
generally) is an issue that the CMA could explore in further detail as 
part of a compliance review. 
 
4.34 A related issue raised by one stakeholder was that students applying 
to foundation courses are not made sufficiently aware of the risk that 
the institution might not accept them onto the full undergraduate 
degree once they have completed their foundation course. We have 
not looked at the way in which universities are describing the route 
from foundation to undergraduate degree, but encourage universities 
to make it clear on what grounds students will be considered for 
further study.  
 
Higher education institution terms and conditions  
 
4.35 Based on the OFT's brief analysis of websites of higher education 
institutions, the terms and conditions students will be subject to when 
at university (which may take the form of the university's rules and 
regulations for students) are sometimes difficult to find.62 They can be 
contained in a number of documents accessible in different places on 
the website or in different policy documents. As we discuss in Chapter 
5, a contractual term binding students to a variety of terms and 
conditions in different places may be unfair and may therefore not be 
enforceable.63
                                      
61 For example, the University of Southampton and University College London both clearly state: BEng (Hons) 
Accredited CEng (Partial) - this degree is accredited as: fully satisfying the educational base for an Incorporated 
Engineer (IEng) partially satisfying the educational base for a Chartered Engineer (CEng). A programme of 
accredited Further Learning will be required to complete the educational base for CEng. 
 It is particularly important, therefore, that students can 
62 This was also the experience of the OFT team that worked on the University Terms and Condition project. 
OFT1522 Universities' Terms and Conditions. Available at www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/consumer-
enforcement/OFT1522.pdf 
63 We cover unfair terms in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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have the existence of terms and conditions brought to their attention, 
can easily access them and know their rights and obligations. 
 
4.36 There appears to be scope for improving access to terms and 
conditions. One option would be for institutions to send terms and 
conditions (along with summaries of additional charges and financial 
support) to students when an offer is made. When, in what form, and 
the fairness of the way in which terms are communicated to students 
is an issue that the CMA could explore in further detail as part of a 
compliance review. 
 
Factors to consider when re-designing information provision  
 
4.37 Respondents highlighted a number of challenges that would need to be 
taken into account if the KIS were to be re-designed, as changing 
information provision requirements may increase the possibility of 
institutional gaming and unintended consequences. For example, if 
institutions respond to standardised quality metrics, this may lead to 
greater course homogenisation and may contradict efforts to increase 
diversity of provision in the undergraduate sector.  
 
4.38 In addition, adding more sources of information could make it too 
difficult for students to process the information available. As part of 
any reforms to information provision, thought should be given to the 
linkup between different information sources. For example, there may 
be ways of strengthening the links between the UCAS website (which 
gets the most student traffic) and the Unistats website (which 
contains the comparable information about courses).  
 
The role of UCAS in supporting student choice 
 
4.39 Making the right choice about where to apply to university is not 
solely dependent on students being able to access accurate and useful 
information. An application process that is easy for students and does 
not unfairly advantage certain students or particular higher education 
institutions can arguably play a pivotal role in helping students apply to 
the institutions that best meet their needs.  
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4.40 UCAS supports student choice by providing a system that appears 
efficient and easy for students to navigate. UCAS, as a single provider 
of application services, provides efficiencies to both applicants and 
higher education institutions.64 UCAS also enjoys high user satisfaction 
scores from students which suggests that students find the UCAS 
application process easy to navigate.65
 
  
4.41 Nevertheless, as outlined in Annexe A, our review of choice tool 
websites demonstrates that, in comparison to the Unistats website, 
there is relatively little information about higher education institutions' 
performance on the UCAS website (for example, student satisfaction, 
time spent in different activities and employment outcomes). Whilst 
we recognise that the websites serve different purposes, given that 
the vast majority of students use the UCAS website there is scope for 
clearer links between the UCAS and Unistats websites in order for 
students to be 'nudged' towards the KIS data available via Unistats. 
 
4.42 The unique applications dataset that UCAS gathers through the 
applications process could also be valuable to third parties who could 
use the information to help students make choices as well as 
providing, for example, analytical services to universities. Through the 
CfI, a number of stakeholders raised concerns that they have not been 
able to access the applications data that UCAS gathers.66
 
 It is possible 
that third parties could make use of the dataset to create valuable 
services but are unable to do so without access to the information.  
4.43 The OFT has been unable to clarify what UCAS' policy is regarding 
access to its unique dataset. We propose that the CMA further 
explores the issue of access to UCAS' dataset as part of its broader 
work looking at the regulatory framework of the sector, including 
                                      
64 In the United States, students have to apply to each university individually and often have to write tailored 
applications as well as complete additional entry tests. In the UK students use a single process for applying to up 
to five providers, and a UCAS application costs £23 in 2014. 
65 When asked 'how would you rate your overall experience of UCAS 44.8 per cent of respondents said 'great', 
49.5 per cent said 'good', eight per cent said 'fair', 0.9 per cent said 'bad', 0.4 per cent said 'awful'. UCAS 
(2013) 'Applicant satisfaction survey'. (Information submitted to the OFT) 
66 The data is used by UCAS Media in the provision of analytical services. UCAS Media is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of UCAS that provides analytical services to higher education institutions, in part based on insight it 
garners from the applications data it gathers. UCAS Media provides approximately £12.2m per year of revenue 
for UCAS – approximately one third of its total revenue (with approximately £13m revenue per year from 
applicants' fees and £9.4m from higher education institutions' fees). The revenue generated by UCAS Media is 
used to subsidise the cost of UCAS' applications services. 
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accountability of industry bodies to ensure that their incentives are 
aligned with those of the sector at large.67
 
  
Supporting students' choice to switch  
 
4.44 The ability of students to switch between courses could provide an 
additional mechanism through which higher education institutions are 
incentivised to respond to student preferences after they get to 
university. From a student's perspective, the ability to switch would 
mean not spending further money on a course which does not meet 
their needs. The threat of losing students, and their associated 
funding, may also increase the incentives of institutions to tailor their 
courses to students' preferences throughout their time at university.  
 
4.45 Overall switching rates between higher education institutions appear, 
at first approach, to be low. The rate of switching between different 
UK higher education institutions amongst full time first degree entrants 
in 2010-11 was 1.9 per cent,68 although the rate of switching 
between departments in the same institution is likely to be higher.69
 
  
4.46 These rates of switching are likely to be influenced by a number of 
barriers to switching, including: 
• the lack of strong incentives for institutions to invest in assessing 
whether students have studied equivalent credits 
• limited information about switching being available to students, and  
• the high financial and social costs faced by students when 
switching.70
                                      
67 The OFT identified similar concerns in its Commercial Use of Public Information (CUPI) market study. In the 
study the OFT found that when a public body is the sole supplier of unrefined information and is also engaged in 
making refined information products, there is a danger that it will restrict access to its unrefined information and 
treat its own refined information operations more favourably than competing businesses. OFT861 'The 
commercial use of public information (CUPI)'. Available at: 
 
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/consumer_protection/oft861.pdf 
68 HESA (2013) 'Non-continuation following year of entry: full-time first degree entrants 2010-11'. Available at: 
www.hesa.ac.uk/content/view/1897/239  
69 The rate of switching between courses at the same institution is not reported to HESA but the OFT considers 
intra-institutional switching is likely to be higher because institutions have the incentive to keep the student (and 
their associated funding) and processes might be easier for students to navigate. 
70 Around 90 per cent of higher education institutions award credits which should, in theory, allow them to 
operate a credit transfer system. The idea is that students can transfer credits (which equate to a notional 10 of 
hours of learning per credit) between institutions should they wish to switch. However, in the UK there is no 
guaranteed right to switch. Higher education institutions will assess students' applications to switch (and the 
credits) on a case-by-case basis and will take into account existing capacity, the student's prior learning 
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4.47 The differences in curriculum and qualification design hinder the 
assessment of whether students have 'banked' the necessary core 
modules.71 If a student decides, and is able to transfer from one 
institution to another part of the way through an academic year, 
depending on when they transfer their tuition fee loan or funding might 
not cover the tuition fees for their new institution. In addition to the 
financial costs, students face the cost of familiarising themselves with 
a new geographical location and circumstances.72
 
  
4.48 Even if students can overcome all these barriers, they may find the 
switching process difficult to navigate. For instance, a 2012 Higher 
Education Academy review found information on credit accumulation, 
transfer and related mechanisms is often presented in a technical, non-
user friendly way and information can be difficult to find.73
 
  
4.49 Stakeholders were keen to highlight that there is a trade-off between 
making switching easier (which would require greater course 
homogenisation) and maintaining a diverse range of courses across the 
higher education sector. The introduction of a more structured system 
to facilitate switching is also likely to come at an administrative cost 
(such as investing in ways of judging whether students have studied 
the necessary core modules) and it is not currently clear that there is 
sufficient demand from students to switch to justify this cost, nor is it 
clear who should pay.  
 
4.50 The complexities and possible unintended consequences of making 
switching between courses and institutions easier reiterates the 
importance of students being enabled to make an appropriate choice 
                                                                                                             
experience and whether they have studied necessary core modules. Higher Education Academy (2013) 'Review of 
credit accumulation and transfer policy and practice in UK higher education'. Available at: 
www.heacademy.ac.uk/assets/documents/flexiblelearning/Flexiblepedagogies/Review_of_Transfer_of_Credit_Repo
rt.pdf 
71 This is particularly the case given the low numbers (currently) involved in switching. A more detailed discussion 
of the credit transfer system can be found here: 
www.heacademy.ac.uk/assets/documents/flexiblelearning/Flexiblepedagogies/Review_of_Transfer_of_Credit_Repo
rt.pdf  
72The switching rate between universities based in London is appears to be about 50 per cent higher than 
elsewhere in the country (3.1 per cent in 2010-11) (HESA (2013) 'Non-continuation following year of entry: full-
time first degree entrants 2010-11'. Available at: www.hesa.ac.uk/content/view/1897/239). This could be 
explained by lower social and economic costs to switching between institutions in the same area – students could 
keep the same friendship groups and potentially stay in the same accommodation. 
73 Higher Education Academy (2013) 'Review of credit accumulation and transfer policy and practice in UK higher 
education'. Available at: 
www.heacademy.ac.uk/assets/documents/flexiblelearning/Flexiblepedagogies/Review_of_Transfer_of_Credit_Repo
rt.pdf 
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of where to study initially. Nevertheless, for those students who do 
want to switch, they need to have access to the information and 
support necessary so that they can switch to institutions that better 
meet their needs.  
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5  THE STUDENT EXPERIENCE AT UNIVERSITY  
 
5.1 A healthy interaction between choice by active students and 
competition between higher education institutions for enrolments 
should result in institutions providing a university experience which 
reflect the needs and preferences of their undergraduate students. 
Through the CfI, the OFT wanted to get a better understanding of how 
this dynamic was developing in practice by looking at the actual 
student experience at university. In particular, we wanted to explore:  
• whether there are particular institutional practices which may result 
in student harm  
• what universities can do to ensure they have a fair relationship with 
their students, and 
• what students can do when things go wrong.  
 
Institutional practices  
 
5.2 Whilst the majority of undergraduate students appear to be satisfied 
with their experience at university, information on some practices 
emerged through the CfI which suggests that the experience for some 
students is less positive.74
• students incurring additional charges which they do not know about 
when applying to university 
 These practices primarily were:  
• fees increasing mid-way through the course, and 
• course structure and content changing mid-way through the course. 
 
Additional charges  
 
5.3 In Chapter 4 we outlined the concerns respondents raised in relation to 
students not knowing about additional charges when they apply to 
university. To the extent that hidden additional charges would affect a 
                                      
74The 2013 National Student Survey found that 85 per cent of all UK students are satisfied with their overall 
university experience (available at: www.thestudentsurvey.com/). Similarly, a 2013 NUS survey found that 78 
per cent of the 287 undergraduate respondents thought that their course had met or exceeded their expectations 
(information submitted to the OFT). 
39  OFT1529 
student's transactional decision had they known about the charges 
when applying, then they could represent a breach of consumer 
protection legislation.75
 
 We outline what constitutes a breach of the 
relevant consumer protection legislation in more detail below.  
Fees increasing mid-way through the course 
 
5.4 It is important that prospective students know how much their 
university experience is likely to cost them. Knowing the total cost of 
higher education upfront allows students fully to assess the options 
available and to better financially plan their time as a student. Fee 
increases in the higher education sector are a particular concern given 
the high barriers to switching between universities (discussed in 
paragraphs 4.43-4.49) which means students cannot easily 'walk 
away' should their fees increase mid-way through the course.  
 
5.5 There is some reporting of increases in fees mid-way through a course, 
particularly for international students.76 The practice seems to stem 
from a large number of universities having discretion to change fees 
paid by international students on an annual basis.77
 
 Such practices 
may create cause for concern and, as fees appear to be increasing for 
some international students, could affect the international reputation 
of the sector. However, because the responses to the CfI did not 
cover the entire sector we do not yet know the full extent of fee 
increases and whether such fee increases have a justifiable 
explanation. The prevalence of fee increases and the fairness of such 
practices is an issue that the CMA could explore in further detail as 
part of a compliance review. 
  
                                      
75 The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (CPRs) define a transactional decision as 'any 
decision taken by a consumer whether it is to act or refrain from acting concerning (a) whether, how and on what 
terms to purchase, make a payment in whole or in part for, retain or dispose of a product, or (b) whether, how 
and on what terms to exercise a contractual right in relation to a product.' OFT1008 'Consumer protection from 
unfair trading'. Available at: www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/cpregs/oft1008.pdf  
76 Information submitted by the NUS to the OFT. 
77 A UUK survey of international student tuition fees found that 58 per cent of institutions do not offer fixed 
tuition fees for international students on courses that last longer than one year. UUK (2013) 'International student 
tuition fees: survey results 2013-2014'. Available at: 
www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/highereducation/Pages/InternationalTuitionFeesSurvey2013-2014.aspx  
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Course content and structure changing mid-way through the course 
 
5.6 An area of concern raised by a number of respondents, particularly 
students themselves, was that elements of their course structure 
changed after they enrolled at their institution. The OFT received 
examples of courses changing to different locations, the number of 
modules being reduced, and lectures being taught at weekends instead 
of in the week as advertised. The OFT also received examples of 
course content changing and modules not being available once 
students got to university. 
 
5.7 Universities need discretion to be able to adjust module options to 
accommodate changes to staff specialism and changes to the 
academic staff employed by the university. Students should therefore 
expect some degree of reasonable change. However, student 
representatives raised concerns that some universities were affording 
themselves broad discretion to change elements of the course beyond 
what is reasonable. 
 
5.8 The OFT has not conducted a full analysis of university terms and 
conditions so cannot at this stage comment on whether terms are 
drafted too broadly. Nevertheless, as highlighted below, institutions 
should be aware that broad terms that provide excessive discretion to 
make changes might be open to challenge under consumer protection 
law. The prevalence of course content and structure changes and the 
fairness of such practices is an issue that the CMA could explore in 
further detail as part of a compliance review. 
 
 
Ensuring a fair relationship between higher education institutions and 
students  
 
5.9 Consumer protection legislations provide a legal framework through 
which higher education institutions can assess their terms, conditions 
and practices and ensure that they are fair. In the time available we 
have not collected enough evidence to form a view about whether the 
concerns identified through our CfI amount to breaches of consumer 
protection law. However, the practices identified may be potentially 
unfair and/or otherwise unlawful. Higher education institutions should 
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therefore be aware of the legislation that governs their behaviour 
towards students and how to avoid infringing it (we provide a more 
detailed discussion of the relevant legislation in Annexe B).  
 
Unfair terms  
 
5.10 It is the OFT's view that a higher education institution's rules and 
regulations that claim to apply to the relationship between the 
institution and undergraduate students are likely to form part of a 
contract for the provision of educational services. The terms set out in 
rules, regulations and written agreements (to the extent they exist) are 
likely to be subject to the test of fairness under the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (UTCCRs) and Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977. 78
 
  
5.11 The OFT has not conducted a comprehensive analysis of institutions' 
terms and conditions.79 However, in Box 1 we have endeavored to set 
out a non-exhaustive list of features that would contribute to improved 
fairness of terms and conditions. It would be advisable for institutions 
to consider these features when drafting, reviewing or amending their 
terms and conditions and making them available to students.80 The 
OFT strongly encourages universities to seek further guidance on 
whether their terms, conditions and practices are complaint with the 
relevant consumer protection laws.81
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
78 The OFT strongly encourages institutions to make sure they are compliant with UTCCRs. More information 
about the UTCCRs can be found here: www.oft.gov.uk/business-advice/unfairterms/detailed/explained/ 
79 However, the OFT has analysed conduct terms and the withholding of degrees for non-academic debt ; the 
relevant report is available here: www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/consumer-enforcement/OFT1522.pdf  
80 This list is an attempt to apply the law referred to above and should not be read as a substitute to the law set 
above and these example should only be read as illustrative of how the law could be applied. The examples do 
not represent a minimum standard to be achieved. 
81 Where a term is found by a court to be unfair, it is not binding on the student. Please refer to OFT guidance for 
further discussion in relation to the UTCCRs (available at: www.oft.gov.uk/business-
advice/unfairterms/detailed/explained www.oft.gov.uk/business-advice/unfairterms/detailed/explained) 
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Unfair commercial practices  
 
5.12 The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 
(CPRs) prohibit unfair commercial practices which distort consumers' 
transactional decisions. Broadly speaking, the CPRs require institutions 
not to treat students unfairly, and prohibit misleading actions, 
omissions or aggressive commercial practices, where these are likely 
to have an impact on a consumer's transactional decision. The CPRs 
Box 1: Features that would contribute to improved fairness of terms and 
conditions in the higher education sector  
• Be clear and unambiguous 
• Be fair and balanced 
• Be easy to access 
• Not bind students to terms that the student has not had the 
opportunity to consider and become familiar with 
• Be prominently brought to the student's attention if terms are 
particularly surprising or important, or, for example, if breach of a 
term is likely to have a serious consequence  
• Not have the effect of causing students to pay increased fees 
without the option of withdrawing and continuing to study 
elsewhere 
• Not impose disproportionately severe sanctions on students for 
being in breach of the terms and conditions 
• Not permit key features of the educational services to be changed 
without a valid reason  
• Not be open to challenge if a term is drafted so widely that it could 
cause student detriment 
• Not permit universities to withhold degrees or progression to the 
next year of study as a sanction for the non-payment of a non-
academic debt  
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also set out some practices that are considered unfair in all 
circumstances.82
 
 
5.13 The OFT has not undertaken detailed research into the way that 
students make decisions and therefore cannot definitively conclude 
whether or not the concerns about certain practices raised in the CfI 
influence students' transactional decisions and so might breach the 
CPRs. However, in Box 2 we have set out the types of practices that 
might be considered misleading actions, misleading omissions or 
aggressive commercial practices based on our concerns arising from 
the responses to the CfI.83 The OFT strongly encourages institutions to 
seek further guidance and assess their practices to ensure they comply 
with the CPRs.84
 
  
5.14 It is also important to remember that being compliant with consumer 
protection legislation is a 'minimum standard'. The sector should be 
aware that acting in ways that could disadvantage students - even if 
such practices do not infringe the law - might harm the reputation of 
the sector and student confidence.  
 
5.15 We have not been able fully to assess the prevalence of certain 
practices in the sector and whether they breach consumer protection 
law. Given the willingness amongst stakeholders to get more clarity 
about the application of consumer law, we propose that the CMA 
carries out further work to clarify the application of consumer 
protection legislation to the sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
82 For an overview of banned practices see OFT1008 'Consumer protection from unfair trading'. Available at: 
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/cpregs/oft1008.pdf 
83 This list is not an exhaustive list of practices that might breach the CPRs. Higher education institutions should 
consider the CPRs themselves and the OFT guidance produced concerning them.  
84 Further guidance on the CPRs can be found at: 
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/cpregs/oft1008.pdf 
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What students can do when things go wrong  
 
5.16 Universities should seek to prevent student harm from occurring and 
one of the ways in which they can do so is by ensuring they are 
compliant with consumer protection legislation. However, even if 
institutions endeavor to treat students fairly it may still be the case 
that not all students have a satisfactory experience. It is important 
Box 2: types of practices that might breach the CPRs if they affect students' 
transactional decisions 
 
Potential misleading actions, in each case in terms of the content of the 
information or the overall presentation 
• Providing information concerning the prospects of graduates from the 
course that is untrue or misleading 
• Providing information about the accreditation of a course that is untrue 
or misleading  
• Providing information about the quality or type of qualification that can 
be achieved by students that is untrue or misleading 
 
Potential misleading omissions  
• Failing to inform students of potential changes to the fees they are 
charged 
• Failing to inform students of potential changes to course content and 
structure  
• Failing to inform students of additional charges that they must incur (or 
are beneficial to incur) to complete their course 
 
Potential aggressive practices 
• Unilaterally increasing the fees part way through the course 
• Unilaterally varying fundamental elements of the course, for example 
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therefore that redress processes across the sector are fit for purpose, 
efficient and effective.  
 
5.17 Through the CfI, the OFT wanted to gather views about how the 
redress process was working in the undergraduate higher education 
sector. This section examines the current redress system, outlines 
improvements that are already underway and makes a few 
suggestions for further improvement. In doing so, the OFT has drawn 
on responses received from students and stakeholders across the 
industry, including key players in the complaints process. 
 
5.18 Most providers' redress processes involve tiers of escalation, starting 
with informal internal channels, progressing to more formal internal 
stages. Students at universities that belong to the OIA Scheme who 
are not content with the university's decision have the option to 
escalate their complaint to the OIA. This system appears to be an 
improvement on the situation before the Higher Education Act 2004 
where over a third of providers had no formal complaints procedure 
and there was no independent body for escalation of complaints.  
 
5.19 The OIA is an ombudsman of last resort for complainants. As well as 
providing an extra independent complaint tier for students, the OIA 
sets standards for institutions by issuing recommendations on the 
robustness of their processes. It is also more cost effective for 
students and providers to resolve complaints in this manner than to 
resort to court proceedings. Students can also complain to the QAA 
about academic standards and quality and about public information 
published by higher education institutions about their courses, where 
concerns indicate serious systemic or procedural problems.85
 
 
Use and speed of the redress system 
 
5.20 In order for the redress system to work effectively, students should be 
able to find out how to complain should a dispute arise and complaint 
processes should be as quick and efficient as possible. There may be 
scope to further improve redress processes. Some students that 
responded to the CfI suggested, for example, that complaint forms 
                                      
85 More information about the QAA's complaint procedures can be found at: 
www.qaa.ac.uk/Complaints/concerns/Pages/default.aspx  
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were not available online, that they were afraid of complaining and 
that they were put off by bureaucratic processes. However, the speed 
of the redress process does seem to be improving. A survey carried 
out in 2009 found that one fifth of cases dealt with by providers took 
more than a year to reach a decision.86 More recent analysis by the 
NUS found that only five per cent of cases were talking longer than a 
year to resolve, suggesting that improvements have been made but 
further improvement is still possible.87
 
  
5.21 Further improvements in providers' redress processes are expected in 
the future. The OIA is currently working with the sector to introduce 
standardised redress practices, such as the number of internal stages, 
the independence of people dealing with the complaint or appeal and 
the reporting of the outcome of cases. It has also recently launched 
early resolution pilots, run by universities and student unions, which 
should further improve the efficiency of complaint processes. 
 
Compliance and deterrence  
 
5.22 The OIA can issue recommendations to institutions to provide redress 
to individual students including, where appropriate, compensation and 
recommendations to change their practices or procedures.88
 
 The OIA 
can publish details of non-compliance with its recommendations in the 
Independent Adjudicator's annual report. To date it has done so on 
three occasions, following which the university complied with the 
OIA's decision. 
5.23 The OIA publishes anonymised case studies of its recent decisions 
which explain how a decision was reached and detail any 
                                      
86 A study conducted in 2009 found that 64 per cent of students considered that the provider did not deal with 
their case within a reasonable time. King's Institute for the Study of Public Policy on behalf of the OIA (2010) 
'Student Satisfaction with the Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education: Report of the OIA 
student survey 2009'. Available at: www.oiahe.org.uk/downloads/Final-Report-of-the-OIA-Student-Survey-with-
Appendices_4.pdf  
87 NUS 2013 survey evidence submitted to the OFT. In the NUS' sample 12 per cent of cases still lasted six 
months or more, five per cent of cases took longer than a year to resolve, and some students finished their 
course before the complaint had been settled. 
88 For example, in one recent case where a cohort of students was dissatisfied with the course delivery after the 
course leader went on sick leave, the OIA recommended the University should offer each of the remaining group 
members the sum of £1,500 for the disappointment, distress and inconvenience experienced in relation to the 
service provided by the University. See: www.oiahe.org.uk/decisions-and-publications/recent-decisions-of-the-
oia/older-case-studies.aspx 
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recommendations made.89
 
 It also publishes the annual personalised 
letter it sends to each university which provides a summary of the 
number of complaints escalated to the OIA that year by students at 
the university, the nature of those complaints, and how the figures 
compares with universities of a similar type. 
The transparency of the redress system  
 
5.24 Data is not currently publicly available on the level or subject of 
complaints received and resolved internally by higher education 
institutions. From the complaints that reach them, the OIA and QAA 
can identify common themes across more than one provider and take 
action to change practices across the sector.90
 
 However, the OIA is 
not privy to (and therefore cannot act on) common complaints that are 
not escalated to the OIA. The QAA can examine internal complaint 
information when it visits a university, but there is no requirement on 
universities to publically report common complaints and no system 
through which internal complaints are routinely monitored and 
common themes (that occur in more than one university) identified. 
5.25 We are of the view that making information about institution-level 
common complaints more widely accessible could allow the 
appropriate bodies to be able readily to identify areas of common 
concern. It could also be beneficial for the QAA to identify common 
areas of dissatisfaction about which students rarely lodge official 
complaints.   
 
The scope of the redress system  
 
5.26 All 'qualifying' institutions, as set out in the Higher Education Act 
2004 in England and Wales, must subscribe to the OIA's complaints 
scheme.91
                                      
89 See for example: 
 'Non-qualifying' private and alternative providers are able to 
join the scheme providing they can demonstrate they have effective 
due diligence and governance. 
www.oiahe.org.uk/decisions-and-publications/recent-decisions-of-the-oia/older-case-
studies.aspx  
90 For example, the QAA could contact several universities and request they change their practices or they could 
promote best practice across the sector.  
91 Qualifying institutions include publically funded institutions and APs (or courses offered by APs) that have been 
'designated' by HEFCE.  
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5.27 Whilst a growing number of non-qualifying institutions are approaching 
the OIA, at the time of writing, only four non-qualifying institutions are 
part of the scheme and therefore students at many higher education 
institutions are unable to access the OIA's route to redress. 
Compulsory subscription would require the enactment of legislation.  
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6  COMPETITION BETWEEN HIGHER EDUCATION 
INSTITUTIONS  
6.1 During the CfI, the OFT considered a number of concerns in relation to 
behaviours and/or practices that may have the potential to weaken or 
distort competition in the higher education sector. In considering these 
issues, we have been informed by our engagement with stakeholders 
and our internal thinking.  
 
6.2 This chapter sets out the OFT's assessment of a range of specific 
issues relating to the way that higher education institutions compete. 
We arrived at this list of issues through stakeholder engagement and 
submissions, recent press coverage of competition issues in higher 
education, and the OFT's own internal thinking: 
• whether there is any evidence of collusive behaviour between higher 
education institutions in setting tuition fees 
• the nature of the relationship between degree-awarding bodies and 
third party teaching institutions that have their degrees validated by 
them 
• the (perceived) potential tension between collaboration amongst 
higher education institutions and compliance with competition law 
• the restriction imposed on applicants to the University of Oxford 
and the University of Cambridge 
• the restriction imposed on all applicants relating to the number of 
courses for which they can apply. 
 
6.3 This chapter sets out these concerns, summarises the views of 
stakeholders, and outlines the OFT's initial assessment of each of 
these issues. 
 
The risk of collusive behaviour between higher education institutions 
 
6.4 It has been widely reported that, since the 2011 reforms, a large 
number of higher education institutions have set fees at, or around, 
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the £9,000 cap,92 raising concerns as to whether this is the result of 
collusive behaviour.93
 
 If such collusive behaviour were taking place it 
would be to the detriment of students, as it would result in higher fees 
and/or lower levels of quality than under more competitive conditions. 
6.5 To date, the OFT has received no complaints or evidence of either 
explicit or tacit collusion between higher education institutions with 
respect to fee setting. 
 
6.6 We have analysed why tuition fees may be concentrated around the 
level of the fee cap, and have found that there are a range of possible 
explanations that would not require collusion between institutions, 
including: 
• The increase in tuition fees to, or close to, £9,000 occurred 
simultaneously with a considerable reduction in the public funding 
of teaching through the HEFCE teaching grant. As a result, it is not 
surprising that fees increased significantly at this point in time. 
• There is excess demand for university places overall and, and likely 
at the level of most individual institutions.94
• Demand for undergraduate places seems to indicate that, at current 
fee levels, demand is not particularly price sensitive.
 In the presence of 
excess demand for places at the £9,000 level, there is limited 
incentive to charge below this level. 
95
                                      
92 According to OFFA, the average headline tuition fee for 2014-15 will be £8,647 (falling to £8,006 taking into 
account all financial support from institutions). 72 per cent of institutions with an access agreement 'will charge a 
maximum fee of £9,000 for some or all of their courses in 2014-15', and 27 per cent of these institutions 'will 
charge £9,000 for all of their courses in 2014-15'. OFFA (2013) '2014-15 access agreements: summary of 
outcomes and data'. Available at: 
 The low 
responsiveness of demand to fee levels might be linked to a number 
www.offa.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2013-04-Access-agreements-
2014-15.pdf  
93 Recent articles in the press have questioned whether this concentration of prices around £9,000 is the result of 
collusive behaviour. For example, see Times Higher Education, 31 March 2011, 'Union calls on MPs to investigate 
possible collusion over tuition fees'. Available at www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/415732.article. 
94 UCAS (2013) 'UCAS End of Cycle Report 2013' (available at: www.ucas.com/sites/default/files/ucas-2013-
end-of-cycle-report.pdf) provides an indication of the level of overall excess demand, reporting that 35,000 
applicants in the 2013 cycle received no offers. At the individual institution level, excess demand could be even 
more pronounced than this statistic suggests, as popular providers could likely fill their available places several 
times over, even when charging fees at the level of the cap.  
95Despite an almost three-fold increase in fees at many institutions following the increase of the tuition fee cap to 
£9,000, demand for undergraduate places has remained broadly stable (although, admittedly, it is difficult to 
know the exact impact of the increase in tuition fees on demand, since there was an artificially high peak in the 
year preceding the change in fees, and an artificially low trough in the year following the reforms). Whilst figure 
3.3 appears to show a reduction in the previous upward trend in student numbers following the increase in tuition 
fees, this represents a relatively small reduction, given the scale of the increase in fees. 
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of factors, including the limited scope for variations in fees to 
impact the overall level of individual student debt, and the nature of 
the student loans system more broadly.96,97
• The economic literature suggests that in markets where consumers 
have limited information about the true quality of a product or 
service, they may use price as a signal of quality.
 
98 In the case of 
higher education, and despite continued efforts to improve the 
scope and quality of information provided, applicants have to make 
decisions based on imperfect information.99
6.7 In conclusion, there seem to be a number of explanations, beyond 
collusive behaviour, for why higher education institutions set tuition 
fees at, or close to, £9,000 per year. With that in mind, and given that 
the OFT did not receive any complaints or evidence about collusive 
behaviour between higher education institutions, it is not appropriate 
to undertake further investigation of these issues at this stage. 
However, it should be noted that the OFT and its successor body - the 
CMA - considers allegations of anti-competitive behaviour that it 
receives carefully.
 In this scenario, some 
students may interpret lower fees as an indicator of lower quality. 
This would likely decrease the extent to which demand increases for 
courses with lower fees, and hence may decrease the incentives for 
higher education institutions to compete on fee levels. 
 
100
 
 
  
                                      
96 For a student taking the maximum maintenance loan for living costs, paying annual tuition fees of £6,000 as 
opposed to £9,000 will result in an overall reduction in the level of debt on graduation of less than 20 percent. 
The impact on actual repayments might be smaller than this, depending on the level of post-graduation income. In 
addition, the nature of the student loans system means that students choosing courses with higher tuition fees 
face a longer period of repayments, but not higher monthly repayments. This deferred impact of fee levels on 
graduates' repayments could also explain applicants' relatively low sensitivity to the level of fees. 
97 It is important to acknowledge that the student loans system is the result of wider higher education policy, 
including facilitating wider participation, and its impact on competition is only one of many factors that the 
government has to consider. 
98 For example, see Scitovsky, T. (1944) 'Some consequences of the habit of judging quality by price', The 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 100-105. 
99 See chapter 4 for further detail on the role and limits of information provision. 
100 Any parties who suspect that a cartel is operating in any market can notify the OFT's Cartels Hotline by 
telephoning 0800 085 1664 or emailing cartelshotline@oft.gsi.gov.uk. After the 1 April 2014 the cartels email 
address becomes cartelshotline@cma.gsi.gov.uk (the Cartels Hotline will continue to be 0800 085 1664) Any 
parties who suspect some other form of anti-competitive behaviour can notify the OFT by emailing 
enquiries@oft.gsi.gov.uk. 
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The relationship between degree-awarding bodies and third party 
teaching institutions 
 
6.8 It is common for third party teaching institutions (both FECs and APs) 
to partner with a traditional higher education institution – a 'degree-
awarding body' - to validate their degrees. 
 
6.9 In the course of the CfI, some third party teaching institutions raised 
the concern that some degree-awarding bodies may impose overly 
stringent conditions on them. More specifically, some third party 
teaching institutions referred to a number of behaviours and practices 
that they considered hinder their ability to compete, including that 
some degree-awarding bodies: 
• dictate the level of tuition fees that third party teaching institutions 
have to charge 
• refuse to validate courses on the basis that these courses will 
compete with their own 
• 'load' costs onto third party teaching institutions for unwanted 
services, so as to increase the overall cost of providing a degree, 
making these teaching institutions less competitive 
• withdraw validation without sufficient notice to allow third party 
teaching organisations to find alternative partner institutions 
• take an excessive amount of time to validate courses 
• do not honour agreements relating to students at the third party 
teaching organisation progressing to further qualifications at the 
partner institution. 
 
6.10 Regarding the first of these issues raised, despite stakeholder 
comments during meetings that degree-awarding bodies try to dictate 
the pricing of courses offered by third party institutions whose courses 
they validate, the OFT has not received any evidence that would 
amount to a compelling case of anti-competitive behaviour. The OFT 
considers that this type of behaviour would amount to a serious 
restriction of competition. As noted above, the OFT and its successor 
body - the CMA - considers allegations of anti-competitive behaviour 
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that it receives carefully, and encourages anyone with specific 
evidence of this type of behaviour taking place to come forward.101
 
 
6.11 The extent to which the other practices set out above have the 
potential to restrict competition appears to be less clear cut, and 
would require an in-depth assessment of the specific impacts of each. 
A key issue in assessing the impact of these types of behaviour is the 
extent to which third party teaching institutions are tied to a single 
validating partner. More specifically, it is important to understand 
whether third party teaching institutions: 
• are able to partner with degree-awarding bodies outside their local 
area, and therefore the extent to which they are able to 'shop 
around' for validating partners 
• face high switching costs once partnered with a validating partner 
that could result in the validating institution enjoying a position of 
market power with respect to third party teaching organisations 
• face significant barriers to becoming degree-awarding bodies 
themselves, and therefore the extent to which these teaching 
institutions are dependent on partnering with a degree-awarding 
body. 
 
6.12 Regarding these points, it has been brought to our attention that a 
number of third party teaching institutions partner with degree-
awarding bodies outside their local area. This suggests that these 
teaching institutions may not be restricted to a small number of 
potential partners, and may be able to 'shop around', potentially 
reducing the extent to which degree-awarding bodies could behave in 
an anti-competitive manner. We have not received specific evidence 
relating to these other two points. 
 
6.13 In addition, it is important to note that there may be justifiable reasons 
for these types of behaviour that do not involve any anti-competitive 
intent on the part of the degree-awarding bodies. As a result, any 
further assessment of these types of behaviour would need to 
                                      
101 Any parties who suspect that a cartel is operating can notify the OFT's Cartels Hotline by telephoning 0800 
085 1664 or emailing cartelshotline@oft.gsi.gov.uk. Any parties who suspect some other form of anti-
competitive behaviour can notify the OFT by emailing enquiries@oft.gsi.gov.uk. After the 1 April 2014 the cartels 
email address becomes cartelshotline@cma.gsi.gov.uk (the Cartels Hotline will continue to be 0800 085 1664). 
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consider the potential benefits of these restrictions.102
6.14 While stakeholders provided numerous examples of behaviour that 
they consider to be anti-competitive, they did not submit substantive 
evidence that suggests that these types of behaviour limit the extent 
to which third party teaching institutions are able to compete. Given 
this, and because there may be legitimate reasons why degree-
awarding bodies may act in this manner, the OFT is not proposing to 
undertake further work on this issue at present, but remains open to 
receiving more substantive evidence of anti-competitive behaviour. 
 
 
 
The potential tension between collaboration and competition law 
 
6.15 Cooperation and collaboration between higher education institutions 
present significant opportunities to undertake a range of activities that 
can benefit students. For example, a wide range of benefits could arise 
from information sharing in the establishment of benchmarking data, 
academic partnerships, or sharing facilities and joint procurement. 
These types of collaboration could result in efficiencies and 
innovations that could benefit students. However, agreements 
between institutions that otherwise compete with each other can raise 
competition concerns in some cases.103
 
 
6.16 Both EC and UK competition law make allowances for agreements that 
may have an anti-competitive effect, provided they deliver 
countervailing benefits to consumers that exceed any detriment from 
reduced competition. Since 2004, parties wishing to engage in 
cooperation and collaboration have been required to self-assess 
whether they are compliant with applicable competition law. In 
addition, UUK commissioned legal guidance on these issues in 
December 2012. Annexe C provides further detail on EC and UK 
competition law. 
 
6.17 In the context of our engagement with stakeholders, several parties 
commented on what they perceived to be a risk that higher education 
                                      
102 For example, degree-awarding bodies are responsible for the quality of courses provided by institutions whose 
qualifications they validate. In such circumstances, a degree-awarding body may be justified in taking actions it 
considers necessary to maintain high quality, and therefore protect its academic reputation. 
103 For more information, see 'Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements', OJ [2011] C11/1. Cooperation is of a 'horizontal 
nature' if it takes place between actual or potential competitors. 
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institutions may choose not to pursue potentially beneficial 
collaboration as a result of unfounded fears of breaching competition 
law, potentially to the detriment of students. In order to ascertain the 
relevance and nature of these concerns, we engaged with 
stakeholders, including through two roundtables with senior university 
representatives (organised in conjunction with UUK). 
 
6.18 Throughout our engagement, we offered stakeholders the opportunity 
to discuss these issues in further detail, with OFT representatives 
providing generic guidance on the economic and legal assessment of 
cooperation agreements and the potential tools that the OFT can use 
to clarify any outstanding concerns. We also encouraged stakeholders 
to provide specific examples of instances where such tensions might 
arise. However, to date, stakeholders have not provided specific 
examples that we consider would merit further specific guidance.104
 
 
6.19 A substantive issue raised in responses to the CfI was stakeholders' 
perceived tension between competition law and the BIS drive for 
publication of benchmarking (cost) data in order to enhance 
efficiencies in the sector.105
 
  
6.20 As set out above, the extent to which this type of behaviour would 
raise a competition concern would depend on whether engaging in this 
type of benchmarking runs the risk of reducing the level of competition 
between institutions, and whether there are any benefits to consumers 
that exceed any detriment from reduced competition. 
 
6.21 On this particular issue, there is scope for the CMA to engage with 
BIS, and other government departments where necessary, to ensure 
that competition considerations are embedded in government-
promoted initiatives relating to the sector. 
 
                                      
104 In addition to informal engagement, the Short Form Opinion (SFO) is the main tool that the OFT can use to 
provide clarity on issues relating to prospective agreements between parties, and whether a certain type of 
agreement would likely be considered to breach competition law. The OFT did not receive any specific requests to 
issue an SFO during the CfI. Furthermore, it is not clear that the issues raised by stakeholders relate to 'novel or 
unresolved questions', which is one of the OFT criteria for issuing an SFO. For further information see 
www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-act-and-cartels/short-form-opinions 
105 Benchmarking is a form of comparative analysis to construct a 'standard measurement of effective 
performance' within a sector (see HESA (2010) 'Benchmarking to improve efficiency'. Available at: 
www.hesa.ac.uk/dox/benchmarking_to_improve_efficiency_nov2010.pdf). The process identifies efficiencies and 
potential cost savings; the effective use of which could bring considerable benefits to the sector. 
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6.22 Throughout the CfI, it is has become evident that some of the 
perceived tension between collaboration and competition may result 
from institutions' lack of familiarity with competition issues and the 
work and priorities of the competition authorities. There may be scope 
for the CMA to engage further with the sector to reiterate the main 
messages emerging from existing guidance documents, including 
under what circumstances cooperation may be considered anti-
competitive. 
 
6.23 In conclusion, we will continue to engage with the sector (and relevant 
government departments where necessary) to increase further their 
understanding of these issues, but we do not propose any specific 
follow up intervention at this stage. 
 
The restriction imposed on applicants to the universities of Oxford and 
Cambridge 
 
6.24 Prospective undergraduate students are not allowed to apply to 
courses at both the University of Oxford ('Oxford') and the University 
of Cambridge ('Cambridge') in any given application cycle. Recent 
articles in the press have referred to this rule as potentially anti-
competitive,106
 
 and the issue was also raised by one stakeholder 
during the CfI. 
6.25 We considered the extent to which this rule could distort competition 
between the two universities to the detriment of students. In doing so, 
we need to consider whether it is likely to result in a net reduction of 
competition, and if so, whether it results in efficiencies that are passed 
on to consumers and that outweigh any detriment from reduced 
competition. 
 
6.26 When considering the impact on competition, it is useful to consider 
competition taking place in two stages: pre-application (when 
applicants are choosing to which institutions they would like to apply), 
and post-application (once applicants have submitted their UCAS 
forms). This rule could have the effect of eliminating competition 
between Oxford and Cambridge in the post-application period, as 
                                      
106 See for instance 'Oxbridge applications rule 'could be challenged'', available at 
www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/oxbridge-applications-rule-could-be-challenged/2006511.article  
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applicants would have chosen between the two universities before 
making their applications. 
 
6.27 In considering the impact on competition, the OFT considered the 
extent to which elimination of competition between Oxford and 
Cambridge in the post-application period would result in a risk that 
either institution could manipulate price, quality or choice, to the 
detriment of students. The OFT's assessment of the rule suggests that 
this is unlikely, for the following reasons: 
• Competition in the pre-application period is likely to remain strong. 
Even if competition in the post-application period is affected, the 
two universities compete to attract prospective students in the pre-
application period.107
• Both universities still face competition in the post-application period 
from other higher education institutions, both in the UK and abroad. 
Prospective students can apply for up to five courses via UCAS. As 
such, Oxford and Cambridge candidates may still benefit from post-
application competition between institutions, even if Oxford and 
Cambridge do not compete with each other during this period. 
 In addition, it is likely that the effect of 
eliminating competition in the post-application period could be to 
intensify competition between the two universities pre-application. 
• It is not clear to what extent institutions are able to compete in the 
post-application period. This is because the main factors on which 
higher education institutions compete to attract students – course 
features, institutional facilities and tuition fees, for example – are 
generally set in the pre-application period. As such, potential 
student detriment caused by reduced post-application competition 
may be only negligible. 
 
6.28 Moreover, even if the rule were to result in an overall negative net 
impact on competition, it might not be a concern if it results in 
efficiencies that exceed the detriment from any reduced competition, 
and if those efficiencies are passed on to students. 
 
                                      
107 University open days, which are a key driver of applicants' choices, tend to be before the deadline for 
applications. This suggests that there is likely to be strong competition in the pre-application period. See for 
example www.theguardian.com/education/2013/jul/02/university-open-days-dates-for-2013  
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6.29 In this case, Cambridge's submission to the CfI set out that this rule 
enables it to interview a higher proportion of applicants than it would 
without the rule, which allows it to make a more in-depth assessment 
of each candidate, and not rely only on academic qualifications. This 
could result in better matching between students and courses, 
potentially to the benefit of both students and the university. 
 
6.30 The OFT considers that under the current arrangements, any impact 
on competition is likely to be limited and there may be efficiency 
benefits. As a result, the OFT does not propose to pursue this issue 
further at present. 
 
The restriction imposed on all applicants relating to the number of 
courses to which they can apply 
 
6.31 Prospective students are limited to applying for a maximum of five 
courses in any given cycle when they apply to higher education 
institutions through UCAS. In 2008 UCAS reduced the number of 
choices applicants can make from six to five following advice from the 
then Department for Education and Skills in 2006, with the aim of 
encouraging students to make more focused applications, and making 
the process more efficient for institutions.108
 
 
6.32 As part of the CfI, the OFT considered whether restricting the number 
of choices that applicants can make when applying could harm 
competition between institutions, to the detriment of students. In 
considering the impact of this restriction, we considered whether it is 
likely to reduce competition between higher education institutions, and 
whether it may result in any countervailing benefits for students. 
 
6.33 As with the rule limiting applicants to applying to only Oxford or 
Cambridge (discussed above), in considering the likely impact on 
competition, it is useful to consider competition taking place in two 
periods: pre-application and post-application. By limiting the number of 
                                      
108 These arguments are set out in the Department for Education and Skills (2005) consultation 'Improving the 
Higher Education Applications Process'. The initial consultation document is available at 
www.education.gov.uk/consultations/downloadableDocs/Improving%20the%20HE%20Applications%20Process
%20-%20summary%20paper%20(PDF).pdf, and the summary of responses, which sets out the proposal to 
reduce the number of choices to five is available at 
http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/6107/1/improving%20the%20he%20applications%20process%20-
%20government%20response%20.pdf. 
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courses for which a prospective student can apply to five, institutions 
may reduce the extent to which they have to compete with each other 
in the post-application period. 
 
6.34 In considering whether the rule is likely to have a significant impact on 
competition, the OFT considered whether reduced competition in the 
post-application period is likely to result in prices above (and 
potentially quality or choice below) the level that would be observed 
absent this restriction. The OFT's assessment of the rule suggests that 
this is unlikely, for the following reasons: 
• As highlighted in the previous section, while competition may be 
reduced in the post-application period, there is likely to be 
considerable competition in the pre-application period. Applicants 
are free to apply for any course offered across all UK higher 
education institutions, and institutions compete to attract students. 
In addition, it is possible that any reduction of competition in the 
post-application period could result in more intense competition pre-
application. 
• It is also unclear to what extent restricting applicants' choices to 
five courses would affect the level of competitive constraint that 
institutions exert on each other in the post-application period, 
relative to a situation where applicants could make more than five 
choices.109
• The Clearing, Adjustment and UCAS Extra processes facilitated by 
UCAS offer prospective students the opportunity to submit 
additional applications beyond their initial five choices.
 As discussed above, it is also not clear whether 
institutions are able to compete in the post-application period, as 
the main factors on which they compete to attract students tend to 
be set in the pre-application period. As a result, any student 
detriment caused by the dampening of post-application competition 
may be limited. 
110
                                      
109 That is, the incremental impact on competition of additional choices is unclear. 
 These 
processes potentially limit any impact this restriction has on 
110 Clearing is the process by which institutions fill any places they still have on their courses following exam 
results. Adjustment is the process for students who have met and exceeded the conditions of their firm choice, 
and wish to change to an alternative course. UCAS Extra is the process by which applicants who are not 
accepted to any of their five choices, or wish to decline all their offers, can add extra choices to their application. 
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competition in the post-application period. 
 
6.35 Even if it reduces competition, there may be a valid argument for this 
type of restriction, if it results in a more efficient application process, 
to the benefit of students. In this case, since each additional choice 
that an applicant makes puts a cost on the institution, it may be 
efficient to restrict the number of choices that each applicant can 
make. 
 
6.36 The OFT considers that this restriction may be unlikely to have a 
significant negative impact on the overall level of competitive 
constraint that institutions exert on each other. As a result, we are not 
proposing to pursue this issue further at present. However, any further 
restrictions to number of choices would require careful consideration 
of the costs of restricting choice, versus the benefits of a potentially 
more efficient application system. 
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7  THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT  
The regulatory regime 
 
7.1 Regulation, defined as a range of rule-based tools designed to 
influence behaviours and/or economic activity, provides a framework 
for markets to operate, for instance by providing certainty as to the 
rights and obligations of different parties in a transaction.111 Regulation 
becomes particularly crucial when policy objectives require specific 
outcomes that may not materialise without some form of intervention, 
such as where market failures compromise the achievement of these 
outcomes.112
 
 A regulatory framework should create an environment in 
which choice and competition can drive beneficial outcomes to the 
extent possible, while recognising that further intervention may be 
needed to achieve these goals in some circumstances. 
7.2 Regulation in the higher education sector can be a complement to 
market dynamics, supporting the achievement of a number of policy 
objectives. For example, regulation can help to protect students 
(especially in so far as there is uncertainty about what is on offer 
before places are accepted), protect the national and global reputation 
of the sector (which would be put at risk if there were not an effective 
system of establishing agreed minimum standards) and facilitate 
embedding fair access considerations into the decision-making of 
institutions. 113
 
 
7.3 However, while regulation is necessary and can protect the interests 
of students, it is important to ensure that too much regulation or 
inappropriate regulation does not get in the way of fair competition by 
institutions for student applicants.114
                                      
111 Regulation captures a wide range of actions, including from primary legislation to regulations established 
and/or administered by specialist sectoral regulators. 
 Badly designed regulation can 
112 See OFT1113, 'Government in Markets' for a detailed discussion of the role of regulation in markets. Available 
at: 
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/general/OFT1113.pdf;jsessionid=9C5007E724E9039629E1EC863
00D1229  
113 A detailed discussion of the case for regulation in the higher education sector, including on the views on the 
purposes of regulation appears in the 2013 report by the Higher Education Commission on 'Regulating Higher 
Education'. Available at: 
www.policyconnect.org.uk/hec/sites/site_hec/files/report/333/fieldreportdownload/hecommission-
regulatinghighereducation.pdf  
114 Although it is not the role of competition authorities to question the policy objectives established in the higher 
education sector, it falls within its advocacy role to advise government and regulators as to how these objectives 
can be best achieved in a competition-friendly manner. 
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hinder competition, for example, by impacting on entry, expansion, 
and/or exit, or by creating a bias in favour of certain types of 
institutions  
 
7.4 In addition, regulation can help to manage some of the risks associated 
with 'unrestrained' competition. For instance, in markets such as 
higher education, where students cannot know everything about what 
an institution will deliver in advance, effective regulation can play a 
vital role in preventing a potential 'race to the bottom' in standards 
which might harm not only students, but also the overall reputation of 
the sector. 
 
7.5 The effectiveness of a regulatory framework is not only influenced by 
the scope of the framework itself, but also by its inherent features 
including how rules are complied with and enforced. As such, our 
analysis has adopted a holistic approach, considering whether the 
higher education regulatory framework is suitable to the new 
environment within which the sector operates. 
 
7.6 Given the importance of regulation in achieving policy objectives and 
its potential impact on choice and competition, it is particularly 
concerning that respondents have, almost by consensus, clearly 
indicated that the regulatory framework for the higher education sector 
is overly complex, outmoded and unfit to support current and future 
policy ambitions. Notwithstanding the efforts of those involved 
(particularly HEFCE) to respond to the demands of a changing 
environment in the absence of suitable tools (most notably primary 
legislation), the evidence submitted to our CfI highlights a number of 
interrelated concerns, highlighted in Figure 7.1 below.  
 
Figure 7.1 Concerns about the regulatory landscape highlighted in the CfI 
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7.7 The issues identified highlight a number of challenges in ensuring that 
the regulatory framework supports student choice as a mechanism to 
drive improvements in higher education. 
 
7.8 Specifically, stakeholders have highlighted a number of issues, 
including the following:  
• Significant concerns from different parties, including a range of 
providers and student representatives, as to whether the current 
framework favours effective competition between different types of 
institutions, and whether it sufficiently mitigates the risk of a 'race 
to the bottom' (in standards/quality) as competitive pressure 
intensifies. 
• Competitive neutrality concerns or whether the regulatory system 
treats all higher education institutions in a fair and equitable manner, 
especially given the existence of a multi-tier system of regulations 
and the existence of sectoral bodies such as UCAS and QAA.  
• Questions as to whether the corporate governance arrangements 
and accountability of bodies created by the sector (UCAS and QAA, 
for example) is appropriate in light of a more varied range of 
providers and the increased role of competition and choice. Specific 
concerns relate to the extent to which all types of institution are 
appropriately represented and provided for, and the accountability of 
these bodies. 
• Lack of an adequate 'exit regime' that reconciles the protection of 
students in the event of a higher education institution abandoning 
an activity or closing down altogether, and the fact that exit needs 
to remain a possibility for competition to work in a sector. 
 
Lack of a comprehensive and holistic regulatory regime supported by 
primary legislation 
 
7.9 Respondents to our CfI have questioned the long term sustainability of 
the existing complex regulatory structure of the sector. In particular, 
concerns were raised about whether the combination of pre-reform 
regulation and ad hoc changes is fit to achieve the desired policy 
64  OFT1529 
objectives in a system in which funding crucially depends on success 
in recruiting students.  
 
7.10 Stakeholders also highlighted the complexity of the regime, with 
different government departments, regulators, industry bodies and 
individual institutions responsible for, or influencing aspects of, 
regulation. The very fact that one of the first tasks of the Regulatory 
Partnership Group (RPG) has been to produce a seminal description of 
how the current higher education funding and regulatory arrangements 
relate to the changing broader English higher education sector (the 
'Operating Framework') bears witness to the complexity of the 
arrangements.115
 
 Figure 7.2 illustrates the complexity of the regulatory 
and funding landscape. 
  
                                      
115 Regulatory Partnership Group (2013) 'Operating framework for higher education in England'. Available at: 
www.hefce.ac.uk/media/hefce/content/about/introduction/workinginpartnership/rpg/operatingframework/operating
_framework_for_HE_11072013_2.pdf  
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Figure 7.2. Higher Education Regulatory and Funding landscape 
 
 
Source: RPG116
 
 
7.11 Notwithstanding the best efforts of all parties involved, a number of 
respondents argued that the absence of primary legislation is a 
concern.117
                                      
116 Regulatory Partnership Group (2013) 'Operating framework for higher education in England'. Available at: 
 They argue that the subsequent use of administrative 
rather than legislative means in addressing issues creates an absence 
of certainty and timeframes which might undermine the ability of 
providers appropriately to plan and invest. Crucially, this might impact 
not only the ability of institutions to compete at the international level, 
www.hefce.ac.uk/media/hefce/content/about/introduction/workinginpartnership/rpg/operatingframework/operating
_framework_for_HE_11072013_2.pdf  
117 HEPI (2014), 'Unfinished business?: Higher education legislation' states that 'The Government's position is 
that new primary legislation remains necessary but there is no time in the legislative calendar for it.' Available at: 
www.hepi.ac.uk/files/Unfinished%20Business.pdf  
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but also might have a differential impact depending on the kind of 
institution (raising competitive neutrality issues). This finding resonates 
with the message emerging from the analysis of the regulatory 
framework undertaken by other parties, including the RPG, HEFCE and 
the Higher Education Commission (HEC). 118
 
 
7.12 The limits to the current regulatory framework manifest themselves in 
the emergence of ad hoc arrangements to manage policy aims, which 
have resulted in three specific concerns: the uncertainty of 
arrangements, a lack of flexibility, and scope for regulatory gaps and 
associated competitive neutrality concerns. 
 
7.13 Since the 2011 reforms, and in the absence of primary legislation, the 
sector has experienced a considerable amount of regulatory 
uncertainty, with regulations being changed often with little or no 
notice. For instance, the timing and nature of the announcement in 
December 2013 further to relax and later eliminate Student Number 
Controls may have hindered the ability of higher education institutions 
to plan in advance their optimal strategies on courses, student 
numbers and investment.119
 
 
7.14 Higher education institutions responding to the CfI have highlighted 
that, in their view, the absence of stable timelines, consistent policy 
and the lack of information on when further reforms might occur 
creates a high degree of uncertainty which undermines their ability 
appropriately to plan and invest. This, in turn, has the potential to 
impact the overall ability of the sector to tailor its offer to student 
demands, and its ability to compete at the international level. 
 
7.15 APs consider that this uncertainty particularly impacts them in a 
negative manner, as it hinders their ability to attract investors to 
                                      
118 The Regulatory Partnership Group has referred to 'the new regulatory regime (.....) means that the provisions 
of existing legislation are being pushed to the limit' (RPG Meeting minutes (20th March 2013). Available at: 
www.hefce.ac.uk/media/hefce/content/about/introduction/workinginpartnership/rpg/march13/note_march_2013.p
df). HEFCE highlighted, in its submission to the BIS Technical Consultation on 'A new, fit for purpose regulatory 
framework for the higher education sector' that legislation is needed in the long term in order to perform its role 
effectively. The Higher Education Commission, in its report on 'Regulating Higher Education', has called for 
Government to commit to legislation or, alternatively, to the main political parties to do so in their manifestos. 
119 In its 2013 Autumn statement, the Chancellor announced the decision to expand student number controls by 
30,000 students in 2014/15, and to abolish student number controls altogether for 2015. The announcement 
came after the admissions process had already begun and institutions would have taken key decisions for the 
upcoming year(s). In addition, at the time of writing, clarification had yet to be given as to APs as to the impact 
of this policy decision on their own student number controls. 
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support their programmes. As such, an additional concern in relation to 
the high level of regulatory uncertainty is the extent to which it 
creates an additional barrier to entry and/or expansion for APs. 
  
7.16 A few respondents have highlighted in their responses to the CfI that 
the current regulatory framework should be reviewed to provide 
greater flexibility to respond to the needs of students and employers. 
Such that the system will also, by becoming more innovative and 
varied, be likely to be more competitive internationally.  
 
7.17 More specifically, an employer representative responding to the CfI 
was of the opinion that the rigidity of parts of the current regime 
(including the funding and student support systems) is potentially 
hindering innovation. The respondent believed more could be done to 
encourage flexibility in creating courses that are more responsive to 
business needs and student preferences. For example, two year 
courses can be an attractive option for firms and students, but with 
potential fee incomes currently capped at £18,000 for a two-year 
course (as opposed to the cap of £27,000 for a three-year course), 
there is little financial incentive.  
 
7.18 Similarly, the lack of flexibility within the student support system does 
not create incentive to provide courses for students who may wish to 
combine full and part time studying within a degree.120
 
  
7.19 In addition to issues relating to the regulatory uncertainty and the lack 
of flexibility in the sector, respondents have highlighted concerns 
about regulatory gaps and the associated scope for a lack of 
competitive neutrality.  
 
Competitive neutrality  
 
7.20 'Competitive neutrality' is the principle that, as far as possible, there 
must be a 'level playing field' between the various types of providers 
within a market.121
                                      
120 For instance, students wanting to transfer from full time to part time studying will face challenges in relation 
to their student loan arrangements. 
 If competitive neutrality is absent from a market it 
121 For more information on competitive neutrality see OFT1242 'Competition in mixed markets: ensuring 
competitive neutrality'. Available at: www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/oft1242.pdf  
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can lead to bias which has the impact of allowing inefficient providers 
to remain in the market to the detriment of consumers. The 2011 
White Paper recognised, but did not explore in any detail, the need to 
establish a level playing field amongst higher education institutions in 
so far as this was possible.  
 
7.21 It should be noted that the OFT does not advocate that all types of 
institutions should be subject to the same regulations; as such the OFT 
does not pursue the removal of all regulatory differences but rather the 
establishment of a clear and consistent approach to regulation, with 
differences being objectively justified. In this respect, it was a 
common view from stakeholders that, while more can be done to level 
the playing field, a one size fits all approach to regulation is not 
appropriate for a diverse higher education sector increasingly 
characterised by a range of types of provider. The regulatory 
environment should treat participants equitably while remaining flexible 
and risk based. 
 
7.22 Many respondents to the CfI agree that the current regulatory system 
has its limits, and is characterised by some regulatory gaps. As the 
focus and leverage of regulation remains linked to historical funding 
arrangements that no longer exist, regulatory gaps are likely to 
emerge, especially in those areas where public funds are not present. 
For instance, the absence of a recognised and comprehensive exit 
regime has become a widespread concern.122
 
  
7.23 Respondents have also highlighted that, even when the sector has 
sought to address the emerging regulatory gaps, the system that has 
emerged has created an imbalance in regulation for different types of 
higher education institution. 
 
7.24 As highlighted in paragraph 7.21, stakeholders have reservations 
about the creation of a single regulatory framework for all institutions. 
Notwithstanding this, respondents to the CfI, including regulators, 
expressed their concerns that regulatory differences between different 
types of providers in a range of dimensions seem unjustified and have 
the potential to create significant market imbalances, undermining 
effective competition and creating a two tiered system. 
                                      
122 See subsection 'Exit regime' to follow. 
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7.25 While all types of institutions perceive other groups to have an unfair 
advantage, APs were particularly vociferous in their view that 
regulation is heavily biased towards supporting TPs. 
 
7.26 During the course of the CfI, stakeholders have raised a number of 
issues, including in relation to differences concerning:  
• student protection and experience (OIA membership and 
participation)123
• subscription and access to essential sector support facilities, such 
as claims that HEFCE offers various support services to TPs that 
APs are not offered, or that the QAA charge tiered rates are 
considerably more expensive to APs 
 
• access to funding, with students at APs being able to access loans 
capped at £6,000, while the cap is at £9,000 for TPs 
• immigration policy issues, including the ability of international 
students at APs to obtain work visas, work part-time or even take 
up internships 
• financial sustainability requirements 
• the conditions pertaining to obtaining (and renewing) degree 
awarding powers 
• APs not being able to access widening participation funding. 
 
7.27 During the course of the CfI the OFT has not undertaken a 
comprehensive analysis of the justification or the impact of the 
regulations applied to various higher education institutions. However, 
the evidence received appears to suggest that further work is required 
in order to ensure that - at the very least, perception of - the lack of 
competitive neutrality is addressed. This resonates with the relevance 
given in a recent report by the HEC to the issue of competitive 
neutrality and the equal application of quality assurance approaches.124
 
 
                                      
123 See Chapter 4 for further detail. 
124 Higher Education Commission (2013) 'Regulating Higher Education: Protecting Students, Encouraging 
Innovation, Enhancing Excellence, Higher Education Commission'. Available at: 
www.policyconnect.org.uk/hec/sites/site_hec/files/report/333/fieldreportdownload/hecommission-
regulatinghighereducation.pdf  
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The role of self regulatory bodies 
 
7.28 Further to the competitive neutrality issues discussed above APs 
commented that many other factors continue to undermine effective 
competition and create the perception of a two-tier higher education 
system, most notably the role and workings of self-regulatory bodies.  
 
7.29 The OFT acknowledges the benefits of sectors seeking to regulate 
themselves to deliver high standards for consumers, and considers 
that self-regulatory regimes are important alongside other tools. 
However self-regulation can also restrict competition whether 
intentionally or not. For instance, the cooperation between parties 
required for self-regulation may lead to anti-competitive practices, 
such as creating barriers to entry. Therefore, self-regulatory initiatives 
must be designed and maintained in such a way as to avoid anti-
competitive consequences.125
 
 
7.30 During the CfI, stakeholders have highlighted their concerns in relation 
to the higher education sector's continuing reliance on self-regulation, 
most notably in relation to corporate governance, and the incentives 
and accountability of sector bodies. Stakeholders have argued that 
with the move to a more competitive environment, the focus on self 
regulation and peer review might need to be re-assessed, and that 
governance and decision making processes could be functioning more 
effectively. 
 
7.31 Concerns have been raised in relation to a number of bodies and 
processes, including those dealing with admissions and quality 
assurance.126
 
 Specific concerns relate to the extent to which all types 
of higher education institutions and users are appropriately represented 
and provided for at Board and decision making levels, and lack of 
clarity about accountability.  
                                      
125 This longstanding commitment to self-regulation is reflected in the OFT's policy statement, (2009) 'The role of 
self-regulation in the OFT's consumer protection work' (available at: 
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/consumer-policy/oft1115.pdf) and we support the development of 
competitive, efficient and innovative markets. 
126 Other concerns mention relate to the role and membership of groups that fulfill a range of functions in the 
sector, including in relation to the degree designation process, or the role of representative organisations in 
ensuring that members are held accountable. 
71  OFT1529 
7.32 In relation to the admissions process, it is important to note that an 
efficient and user-friendly application process should facilitate access 
and application to a full range of institutions (see Chapter 4 for further 
detail).  The success of higher education institutions may be 
dependent on (the nature of) their participation in UCAS, and it is 
important therefore that UCAS, as the centralised admissions system, 
does not unduly restrict entry or distort competition in any manner.127
 
 
7.33 UCAS has a tiered membership structure, with different rights and 
obligations depending on the type of membership.128
 
 Through the CfI, 
stakeholders suggested that UCAS' members may have a conflict of 
interest in assessing applications for (different types of) membership 
by higher education institutions seeking to become new members. The 
concerns relate to the possibility that UCAS' members have the ability 
to restrict access to the UCAS platform through their control of 
membership, either by making it difficult for institutions to become 
members, or by restricting the access rights of certain membership 
groups.  
7.34 We have not found evidence to suggest that UCAS is currently unduly 
restricting membership and hence access to the UCAS portal to higher 
education institutions.129
 
 However, and despite our repeated attempts 
to get a better understanding (including through engagement with 
UCAS) of the structure and criteria for access to different categories 
of UCAS membership, we have been unable to assess whether 
stakeholders' concerns are justified or not. Should they be justified, 
there is a risk that, as the sector becomes more diversified, UCAS' 
governance arrangements (particularly the rights of full members to 
vote on resolutions) will create barriers to some institutions being able 
to compete for students.  
7.35 With that in mind, and in the context of (further) advocacy work to 
address the general concerns identified in this chapter in relation to the 
regulatory framework,130
                                      
127 UCAS subscribers are those higher education providers that have their courses listed on the UCAS application 
system. 
 we propose that the CMA works with the 
128 Under its membership arrangements only full members (as opposed to associated or partnership members) 
have the right to attend annual general meetings and vote on certain resolutions and call or propose resolutions at 
general meetings.  
129 The current UCAS membership consists of 373 institutions; of these 149 are universities, medical schools or 
university colleges, 180 are FE colleges and 44 are private universities and colleges 
130 It should be noted that this chapter deals with some of the concerns relating to UCAS, with others being 
analysed in further detail in Chapter 4, under the epigraph of 'the role of UCAS in supporting student choice' 
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sector to explore how the governance and accountability arrangements 
of UCAS can be improved so as to address the concerns identified 
during the CfI.  
 
7.36 In relation to quality assurance, stakeholders have expressed concerns 
as to whether the signalling of quality provided by the QAA is 
appropriate. Information on many variables widely considered relevant 
to the assessment of the value added provided by higher education 
institutions is not collected or is insufficiently signposted (for example, 
qualifications of teaching staff, engagement between teaching staff 
and students).131 Moreover, respondents considered the QAA to be too 
focused on process rather than outcome, and expressed concerns that 
even in those cases where performance below acceptable standards 
has been identified, no sanctions have been enforced.132
 
 
7.37 More specifically, it has been argued that lack of external and 
independent accountability might be a significant QAA weakness 
when addressing issues that are relevant for the sector but might be 
challenging for some institutions. As such, the current system seems 
to favour the maintenance of a status quo characterised by 'peer 
review' and process-focused compliance that has yet to evolve in 
response to the more central role of student choice in the sector.  
 
7.38  Similarly to UCAS, we propose that, the CMA works with the sector 
to explore how the accountability arrangements within the quality 
assurance regime can be enhanced so as to reflect the interests of the 
wider stakeholder community - most notably students - and the 
changing environment within which the sector operates.  
 
Lack of an exit regime 
 
7.39  Exit, in this context, is taken to mean the departure from the market 
of either an entire institution, or part of its activities, for example a 
department or a particular degree. Introducing strong competition to 
the sector will not be enough to prevent the social costs associated 
with exit, as there is a risk of students being left without any 
                                      
131 See Chapter 4 for a further analysis of the factors driving quality in the higher education sector. 
132 As exemplified by the fact that work by Which? has identified a number of institutions that fail to follow the 
QAA guidelines on contact hours. Which?/HEPI (2013) 'The student academic experience survey'. Available at: 
www.staticwhich.co.uk/documents/pdf/the-student-academic-experience-survey-319689.pdf  
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education provision (and in debt). Exit needs to remain a real 
possibility for competition to have the desired policy impact in this 
sector, however it is important to reconcile this with the effective 
management of the social costs associated with exit.133
 
  
7.40 Within the current policy environment the chances of a higher 
education institution exiting the sector have increased, while the 
recent removal of Student Number Controls reduces the incentives of 
institutions to pick up students from those 'exiting' the sector.134
 
  
7.41 The OFT had identified this as an area to explore in its CfI, especially 
as regards to how exit regimes are designed in public markets matters. 
A well designed regime can support a 'virtuous' competitive cycle if it 
mitigates the risk of service disruption when courses or institutions 
close. A poorly designed one in this sector could severely blight 
students' long term prospects.  
 
7.42 Respondents across the board (including regulators and student 
representative groups) have expressed strong concerns about the 
absence of a clear exit regime.  
 
7.43 Although these concerns might be addressed within any future 
legislation, in the interim HEFCE is undertaking some work exploring 
the regulatory consequences for higher education institutions that no 
longer meet the requirements for designation. We advise the CMA, 
drawing on the OFT's experience on the design of market oversight in 
public markets, to work with HEFCE and other relevant parties on how 
best to reconcile the effective management of the social costs 
associated with exit and the fact that exit needs to remain a real 
possibility for competition to work in a sector.  
 
  
                                      
133 OFT1468 'Orderly Exit: Designing continuity regimes in public markets'. Available at: 
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/public-markets/OFT1468.pdf  
134 Higher Education Commission (2013) 'Regulating Higher Education, Protecting Students, Encouraging 
Innovation, Enhancing Excellence'. Available at: 
www.policyconnect.org.uk/hec/sites/site_hec/files/report/333/fieldreportdownload/hecommission-
regulatinghighereducation.pdf  
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Conclusions and recommendations 
 
7.44 Our analysis has indicated that there is a need for substantive reform 
to the regulatory environment in order to make it better suited for a 
sector increasingly defined by choice and competition.  
 
7.45 With that in mind, we think that there is scope for the CMA, working 
with and through stakeholders, to inform the design of the regulatory 
regime, providing recommendations as to the principles to abide by 
and how they can be best implemented in an effective and efficient 
manner in order to ensure competition and choice. This work should 
focus, amongst other issues, in addressing the concerns related to 
competitive neutrality, self-regulation and lack of exit regime identified 
in this report.  
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8  ISSUES THAT WARRANT FURTHER CONSIDERATION  
8.1 The OFT's overall impression is that the English undergraduate higher 
education sector is working well for students. Levels of satisfaction 
are high, higher education institutions do appear to be competing for 
students (albeit more on the quality rather than the price of provision), 
and there are numerous sources of information to help students decide 
which courses to apply for.  
 
8.2 However, this CfI has identified scope for improvements which if 
implemented the OFT believe would further strengthen the sector. This 
section outlines what further work could be done by government, the 
sector and our successor body the CMA to address the issues 
identified in this report.  
 
Enabling student choice  
 
8.3 As outlined in Chapter 4, the CfI revealed that the information 
provided to students can be improved. More specifically, stakeholders 
have expressed their concerns about the coverage, accuracy, and 
comprehensiveness of the information provided to students through 
government-endorsed websites and other similar sources. Getting a 
more rounded picture of the learning environment (including contact 
hours, class size and teaching approach) and employment prospects 
figured prominently amongst the concerns raised by stakeholders. 
 
8.4 HEFCE is currently leading a review of information provision to 
prospective students.135
 
 We recommend the CMA shares the insights 
we have gathered with HEFCE in order to inform their on-going review.  
8.5 There are also steps higher education institutions can take to ensure 
students are fully informed about their likely undergraduate experience. 
There is scope to follow best practice by making clear to prospective 
students any additional charges, options of financial support and terms 
and conditions in an easily accessible and prominent way. Ideally, such 
information could be made available to students when they are 
considering where to apply and when they are made an offer. We 
                                      
135 For more information about the review see: www.hefce.ac.uk/whatwedo/lt/publicinfo/review  
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advise the CMA to work with relevant sectoral bodies on their ongoing 
work in this area, including HEFCE and OIA, as well as higher 
education institutions, to address these issues and to help to ensure 
the way in which universities and third parties describe the university 
experience is useful and valid. 
 
Ensuring higher education institutions treat students fairly  
 
8.6 It is important that students are treated fairly by higher education 
institutions. Consumer protection legislation provides the legal 
framework through which to assess university practices to ensure that 
they are fair. 
 
8.7 As outlined in Chapter 5, we have identified some practices students 
experience at university which appear to be at odds with the spirit of 
consumer protection legislation. These practices include fees 
increasing mid-way through students' courses, course content and 
structure changing without adequate notice or reason, and students 
incurring unexpected additional charges. We have not established the 
prevalence of these practices or reached a conclusion as to whether 
they are likely to breach consumer regulations, but consider that 
further work is necessary.  
 
8.8 Therefore, the OFT recommends the CMA takes forward a compliance 
review to identify the prevalence of practices that have the potential 
to lead to student harm, establish whether they are likely to breach 
consumer protection legislation and/or do not represent best practice 
and, consider the most suitable tools to address any related concerns. 
 
8.9 It is also important that students can access appropriate channels of 
redress when things go wrong. Despite significant improvements to 
the complaint and redress processes, students' awareness of redress 
processes could be improved and the speed with which institutions 
deal with complaints could be enhanced. Further, we encourage the 
OIA and QAA, together with BIS, to consider whether suitable tools 
are in place to address common complaints that arise across different 
institutions, thematic areas of concern, and to ensure all students can 
access appropriate channels of redress.  
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Competition between higher education institutions  
 
8.10 If higher education institutions were to engage in anti-competitive 
practices (such as agreeing fee levels or limiting courses on offer), the 
potential benefits of competition, such as increased efficiency and 
innovation in response to student demands, will not be realised.  
 
8.11 Through the CfI, the OFT sought to give respondents the opportunity 
to come forward if they had evidence of anti-competitive practices. 
The intention was to consider whether such evidence suggested 
further action was required by the OFT or CMA. As outlined in Chapter 
6, we have not received complaints or evidence that would grant, at 
this stage, launching a competition investigation.136
 
 
8.12 In addition, we also analysed a number of practices that could 
potentially restrict competition. These include the restriction placed on 
applicants relating to the number of courses for which they can apply 
through UCAS, and the restriction imposed on potential applicants to 
the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. On balance, we consider 
that the impact on competition of these practices is, at best, 
ambiguous and need to be considered in the context of other potential 
benefits for students. With that in mind, we do not consider these as 
priority areas for further CMA work. 
 
Regulatory concerns  
 
8.13 Respondents have, almost unanimously, clearly indicated that the 
regulatory framework for the higher education sector is overly 
complex, outmoded and unfit to support current and future policy 
ambitions. Notwithstanding the efforts of those involved (particularly 
HEFCE) to respond to the demands of a changing environment in the 
absence of suitable tools (most notably primary legislation), the 
evidence submitted to our CfI highlights a number of interrelated 
concerns.  
 
                                      
136 Nevertheless, the OFT and its successor body - the CMA - will take any allegations of behaviour which 
breaches of the Competition Act, such as agreements between Higher Education institutions to set fees or limit 
the range of courses on offer, extremely seriously. We encourage parties to provide any relevant information via 
0800 085 1664 or email cartelshotline@oft.gsi.gov.uk  
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8.14 As outlined in Chapter 6, the regulatory issues and gaps that were 
raised by respondents include:  
• significant concerns as to whether the current framework facilitates 
effective competition between different types of institution and 
sufficiently mitigates the risk of a 'race towards the bottom' (in 
standards/quality) 
• whether the regulatory system treats all higher education 
institutions in a fair and equitable manner, especially given the 
existence of a multi-tier system of regulations and the existence of 
sectoral bodies such as UCAS and QAA 
• whether the corporate governance arrangements and accountability 
of bodies created by the sector (for example UCAS, QAA) is 
appropriate  
• concerns about the lack of an adequate 'exit regime' in the event of 
a higher education institution abandoning an activity (or closing 
down altogether). 
 
8.15 With that in mind, the OFT think that there is scope for the CMA, 
working with and through stakeholders, to inform the design of the 
regulatory regime, providing recommendations as to the principles to 
abide by and how they can be best implemented in an effective and 
efficient manner in order to ensure competition and choice. Therefore, 
the OFT recommends that the CMA considers how to best take 
forward this work, aiming to address the concerns identified above. 
  
 ANNEXE A: COVERAGE OF QUALITY INDICATORS ON CHOICE TOOL WEBSITES 
UCAS Unistat
Complete university 
guide Which? university Push What Uni?
Institution AND course 
specific
Institution AND course 
specific
Institution OR course 
specific
Institution AND course 
specific
Institution level 
only
Institution AND course 
specific
379 406 155 287 138 409
Spending No No Yes No No No
Staff to student ratio No No Yes No No No
Quality of teaching staff No No No No No No
Quality of students (entry requirements) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class size  No No No No No No
Teaching methods No Yes No Yes No No
Research environment  No No Yes No No No
Level of intellectual challenge No Yes No Yes No No
Assessment methods No Yes No Yes No Yes
Extent and timing of feedback No Yes No Yes No No
Student performance (degree classification) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student retention No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Percentage of graduates in employment/further study No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Percentage of graduates in related work No Yes Yes Yes No No
Additional/specific entry requirements Yes No No Yes No Yes
A Level choices of previous/current students No No No Yes No Yes
Fees Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Bursaries/scholarships Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Percentage of applicants receiving offers No No Yes Yes Yes No
Student satisfaction No Yes Yes Yes No No
Module information No No No Yes No Yes
Average salary 6 months after graduation No Yes Does not specify Yes No No
Average salary 40 months after graduation No Yes Does not specify No No No
Student reviews No No No Yes Yes Yes
Link to university website Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Advertisements Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of institutions featured
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 ANNEXE B: THE RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS 
HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS' PRACTICES  
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999  
 
B1 It is the OFT's view that a higher education institution's rules and 
regulations that apply to the relationship between the institution and 
undergraduate students are likely to form part of a contract for the 
provision of educational services. The terms set out in the rules and 
regulations are likely to be subject to the test of fairness under the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (UTCCRs). 
 
B2 This section of the report provides an introduction to the consumer 
protection legislation and should help higher education institutions 
start to assess whether their practices are compliant with the law. It 
should not be considered a complete list of the law that applies to the 
sector or as a guide to compliance with the law.  
 
B3 The assessment of fairness is carried out having regard to the nature 
of the goods or services to be supplied, all the circumstances 
attending the conclusion of the contract and the contract as a whole. 
In assessing fairness, institutions should consider how a term could 
potentially be used in practice, as well as how it is actually relied on.  
 
B4 The UTCCRs protect consumers against unfair standard terms in 
contracts with sellers or suppliers of goods and services. Terms should 
be expressed in plain, intelligible language (Regulation 7) and should 
not, contrary to the requirement of 'good faith', cause a significant 
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the 
contract, to the detriment of the consumer (Regulation 5(1)).  
 
B5 The requirement of 'good faith' embodies a general 'principle of fair 
and open dealing'.137
                                      
137 Per Lord Bingham of Cornhill in Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2001] UKHL 52.  
 It means that terms should be expressed fully, 
clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps and that 
terms that might disadvantage consumers should be given appropriate 
prominence.  
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B6 However, transparency of terms is not enough on its own, as 'good 
faith' relates to the substance of terms as well. Providers should not 
to take advantage of consumers' weaker bargaining position including 
his or her needs, lack of resource, lack of experience or unfamiliarity 
with the subject matter of the contract.  
 
B7 Schedule 2 to the UTCCRs contains an indicative and non exhaustive 
list of terms that may be unfair. All of the potentially unfair terms in 
Schedule 2 have the aim or effect of reducing the consumer's rights 
under the ordinary rules of contract or the general law. Broadly, they 
either: 
• limit the rights of consumers and stop them making certain legal 
claims against the supplier, which they could otherwise have made 
or  
• give the business rights against the supplier, which it would not 
otherwise have had. 
 
B8 When assessing a term for unfairness, the OFT's considerations 
normally include 
• how a term could be used - it may be considered unfair if it could be 
capable of causing detriment to consumers, even if it is not at 
present being used unfairly in practice  
• whether the term changes the normal position seen by the law as 
striking a fair balance  
• whether a term is weighted in favour of the business  
• all other terms of the contract  
• the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was 
concluded  
• any relevant circumstances when the contract was concluded. 
 
B9 A term is open to challenge if it is drafted so widely that it could cause 
consumer detriment. Where a term is found by a court to be unfair, it 
will not be binding on the consumer. Please refer to the OFT's 
82  OFT1529 
guidance on unfair terms for further discussion in relation to the 
UTCCRs.138
 
 
Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 
 
B10 The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 
(CPRs) prohibits unfair commercial practices which distort consumers' 
transactional decisions. Broadly speaking, the CPRs require firms not 
to treat consumers unfairly, and prohibit misleading or aggressive 
commercial practices, where these are likely to have an impact on a 
consumer's transactional decision, as well as setting out some 
practices that are considered unfair in all circumstances. 
 
B11 The concept of a 'transactional decision' covers a wide range of 
decisions that have been, or may be, taken by consumers in relation to 
products or services. It is wide in chronological scope, covering 
decisions taken before, during and after a contract is formed. 
 
B12 Under Regulation 5 of the CPRs, a commercial practice is a misleading 
action if it contains certain false information (including about the 
parties' commitments and rights), or if its overall presentation is 
misleading, and the consumer takes, or is likely to take, a transactional 
decision he would not have otherwise taken as a result (Regulation 
5(2)). 
 
B13 Under Regulation 6 of the CPRs, a commercial practice is a misleading 
omission if it omits or hides material information, or provides it in an 
unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous manner and the consumer takes, or 
is likely to take, a transactional decision he would not have otherwise 
taken as a result (Regulation 6(1)). 
 
B14 Under Regulation 7, the CPRs also prohibit aggressive commercial 
practices. A commercial practice is aggressive if in its factual context 
it is likely to significantly impair the consumer's freedom of choice or 
conduct in relation to a product or service, through '... the use of 
harassment, coercion or undue influence'. The effects of the practice 
                                      
138 OFT311 
 'Unfair Terms Guidance'. Available at: www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/publications/publication-
categories/guidance/unfair-terms-consumer/oft311  
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must be to cause or be likely to cause the consumer to take a 
transactional decision he would not otherwise have taken.  
 
B15 In assessing whether a commercial practice uses harassment, coercion 
or undue influence, relevant factors include the timing and nature of 
the practice (Regulation 7(2)(a)) and '... any specific misfortune or 
circumstance of such gravity as to impair the consumer's judgment, of 
which the trader is aware, to influence the consumer's decision with 
regard to the product' (Regulation 7(2)(c)) and 'any threat to take 
action which cannot legally be taken' (Regulation 7(2)(e)). The CPRs 
specifically set out that 'undue influence' means '... exploiting a 
position of power in relation to the consumer so as to apply pressure, 
even without using or threatening to use physical force, in a way 
which significantly limits the consumer's ability to make an informed 
decision' (Regulation 7(3)(b)). 
 
B16 Breach of the CPRs may be a criminal offence and may also be 
enforced by way of civil enforcement.139
 
 
B17 In relation to the potential breaches of the UTCCRs [UCTA] and the 
CPRs set out above, where there is harm to the collective interests of 
consumers, enforcement action may be taken by the OFT (and the 
OFT's successor from April 2014, the CMA), Trading Standards 
Services and other enforcers under Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002. 
An enforcement order can be sought to stop unfair commercial 
practice being used, or a potentially unfair or unreasonable term being 
relied on and included in contracts.140
 
 
Other Relevant Legislation 
 
B18 Other legislation is relevant to the relationship between higher 
education institutions and students that ought to be borne in mind by 
institutions when considering their and their students' rights and 
obligations. For example, consideration should be given to the Supply 
of Goods and Services Act 1982, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
                                      
139 OFT1008 'Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading'. Available at: 
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/cpregs/oft1008.pdf  
140 OFT512 'Enforcement of consumer protection legislation'. Available at: 
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/enterprise_act/oft512.pdf  
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1977, the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998, 
as well as to other applicable laws.  
 
B19 It is not within the scope of this report to consider all relevant 
legislation or its application to the sector in detail. However, the OFT 
published a report entitled 'Universities' Terms and Conditions'141
                                      
141 OFT1522 'Universities' Terms and Conditions'. Available at: 
 in 
February 2014 that considers the application of consumer protection 
legislation and other relevant laws in relation to certain terms in 
university contracts (in particular terms that prevent students from 
graduating if they owe monies to the institution which relate to non-
tuition fee debts). The report may be helpful regarding the application 
of certain legislation that is likely to be relevant to institutions 
operating in the higher education sector. Neither report can be a 
substitute for independent legal advice on these matters. 
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/consumer-
enforcement/OFT1522.pdf 
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ANNEXE C: THE RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS 
ANTI-COMPETITVE BEHAVIOUR  
Agreements - legal background 
 
C1 Since 2004, parties concerned about breaching competition law have 
been required to self-assess whether their agreements comply with 
applicable UK and EU competition law, including laws preventing anti-
competitive agreements.  
 
C2 Section 2 of the Competition Act 1998 (CA98) prohibits agreements 
or concerted practices which have as their object or effect an 
appreciable142 prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within 
the UK (or a part of it) and may affect trade within the UK (or a part of 
it), unless they fall within an excluded category143 or are exempt in 
accordance with section 9 of the CA98. The prohibition in section 2 of 
the CA98 is referred to as 'the Chapter I prohibition'. Any agreement 
which falls within the Chapter I prohibition and is not exempt is void 
and unenforceable.144
 
 
C3 The European equivalent of the Chapter I prohibition is Article 101 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), with 
exemptions possible in accordance with Article 101(3) of the TFEU. 
When the OFT applies national competition law to an agreement or 
concerted practice that has the potential to affect trade between EU 
Member States, it is required also to apply Article 101 of the TFEU to 
that agreement or concerted practice.145
 
 
C4 Under section 60 of the CA98, when determining a question arising 
under Part 1 of the CA98 – which includes the Chapter I prohibition – 
the OFT must ensure that (having regard to any relevant differences 
between the provisions concerned) there is no inconsistency with the 
                                      
142 As to the requirement for appreciability, see OFT401 'Agreements and concerted practices' at paragraphs 
2.15 to 2.21. Available at: www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/ca98_guidelines/oft401.pdf  
143 Section 3 of the CA98 provides that the Chapter I prohibition does not apply to any of the cases in which it is 
excluded by or as a result of Schedules 1-3 to the CA98. 
144 Section 2(4), CA98. 
145 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ [2003] L1/4, Article 3. 
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principles laid down by the TFEU and the European Court146
 
 and any 
relevant decision of the European Court. It must also have regard to 
any relevant decision or statement of the European Commission. 
C5 For any competition law analysis of an agreement between relevant 
parties, the OFT would consider it appropriate to have regard to the 
Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not 
appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the TFEU147 
('De Minimis Notice'), Commission Notice Guidelines on the application 
of Article 101(3) of the Treaty148 ('Article 101(3) Notice') and 
Commission Notice: Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of 
the TFEU to horizontal-cooperation agreements (EU Horizontal 
Guidelines).149
 
  
C6 In addition, the assessment of an agreement between parties 
represents a restriction of competition by object or effect contrary to 
the Chapter I prohibition (and/or Article 101(1) of the TFEU) is only 
one side of the analysis in this area. The other side, possible 
exemption under section 9 of the CA98 (and/or Article 101(3) of the 
TFEU), relates to the assessment of the pro-competitive effects of 
restrictive agreements.  
 
C7 The European Commission may adopt block exemption regulations so 
that particular categories of agreement which it considers satisfy the 
conditions in Article 101(3) are not prohibited under Article 101 
('Block Exemption Regulations'). Where an agreement is covered by a 
Block Exemption Regulation the parties to the agreement are relieved 
of the burden of showing that their agreement satisfies the conditions 
in Article 101(3) and must only demonstrate that the agreement is 
block exempted. 
 
                                      
146 The European Court comprises the Court of Justice and the General Court (previously the Court of First 
Instance). 
147 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under 
Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (de minimis) OJ [2001] C368/13. 
148 Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty OJ [2004] C101/97. 
149 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ [2011] C11/1. Co-operation is of a 'horizontal nature' if it takes place 
between actual or potential competitors.  
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C8 Even if, in an individual case, no block exemption regulations apply 
and a restriction of competition by object has been proven, an 
individual exemption under section 9 of the CA98 (and/or Article 
101(3) of the TFEU) can be invoked as a defence. Four cumulative 
conditions (the 'exemption criteria') must be met for such an 
exemption to apply. The party claiming such an exemption bears the 
burden of proof for substantiating, with specific evidence, that the 
exemption criteria are met.150
 
 
Abuse of a dominant position - legal background 
 
C9 Since 2004, parties have been required to self-assess whether their 
agreements comply with applicable UK and EU competition law, 
including laws preventing abuses of a dominant position. 
 
C10 Section 18(1) of the CA98 prohibits, in certain circumstances, conduct 
by one or more parties which amounts to an abuse of a dominant 
position, unless it falls within an excluded category.151
 
 The prohibition 
in section 18(1) of the CA98 is referred to as 'the Chapter II 
prohibition'. Conduct which amounts to the abuse of a dominant 
position is prohibited and the parties involved may be subject to a 
financial penalty and/or to directions appropriate to bring the 
infringement to an end. 
C11 The European equivalent of the Chapter II prohibition is Article 102 of 
the TFEU. When the OFT applies national competition law to conduct 
amounting an abuse of a dominant position which has the potential to 
affect trade between EU Member States, it is required also to apply 
Article 102 of the TFEU to that conduct.152
 
 
C12 Under section 60 of the CA98, when determining a question arising 
under Part 1 of the CA98 – which includes the Chapter II prohibition – 
the OFT must ensure that (having regard to any relevant differences 
between the provisions concerned) there is no inconsistency with the 
                                      
150 For further guidance, see for example OFT401 'Agreements and concerted practices.' Available at: 
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/ca98_guidelines/oft401.pdf  
151 Section 19 of the CA98 provides that the Chapter II prohibition does not apply to any of the cases in which it 
is excluded by or as a result of Schedule 1 or Schedule 3 to the CA98. 
152 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ [2003] L1/4, Article 3. 
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principles laid down by the TFEU and the European Court153
 
 and any 
relevant decision of the European Court. It must also have regard to 
any relevant decision or statement of the European Commission. 
C13 Unlike the Chapter I prohibition or Article 101 of the TFEU, there are 
no block or parallel exemptions from the Chapter II prohibition or 
Article 102 of the TFEU. In other words, neither the CA98 nor the 
TFEU provides that an abuse can be exempted because it produces 
benefits. However, conduct may not be regarded as an abuse, even if 
it restricts competition, where there is an objective justification for the 
conduct. For example, a refusal to supply might be justified by the 
poor creditworthiness of the customer. However, it will still be 
necessary for a dominant party to show that its conduct is 
proportionate.154
                                      
153 The European Court comprises the Court of Justice and the General Court (previously the Court of First 
Instance). 
 
154 For further guidance, see for example OFT402 'Abuse of a dominant position'. Available at: 
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/ca98_guidelines/oft402.pdf  
